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ABSTRACT
An attempt is made to evaluate leadership in the 
Liberal party of Canada in the context of a particular form of 
selection process. In particular, the relationship of pragmatic, 
"brokerage” leadership to the degree of conflict or consensus 
characteristic of the selection process is explored. Utilizing 
existing historical and quantitative research, the nature of 
leadership selection in the Liberal party can be seen as 
basically a consensual, rather than competitive (democratic), 
process. This characteristic is largely a result of the 
prevailing structure and ideology of the party, as well as of 
the leadership convention itself. It can be maintained, there­
fore, that the performance of party leaders within the political 
system may well be more related to the nature of party, than 
to a mere pragmatic response to certain societal conditions.
ii
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
AN APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
Canadian party leaders^ have been the subject of a 
relatively extensive volume of scholarly.research. The 
analysis, however, of leadership in Canadian parties has been 
largely confined within what may be termed the historical 
approach.2 This approach generally contains two basic 
deficiencies - an exaggerated emphasis on personality as 
opposed to ideological, institutional or social factors,^ 
and an inordinate or complete stress on the "output" aspect 
of party leaders at the expense of a consideration of
l"Party leader" refers strictly to individuals who are 
recognized as the leader of the party in terms of both its 
electoral and Parliamentary activity.
2Some examples of the historical school are: Joseph 
Schull, Laurier: The First Canadian. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1965);
H. B. Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King: 1924-1932. The 
Lonely Heights. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963); 
Kenneth McNaught, A Prophet in Politics: A Biography of J. 
Woodsworth. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959); and 
Bruce Hutchison, Mr. Prime Minister. 1867-1964. (Toronto;
Longmans, 1964).
^Two works which have studied leadership in the context 
of wider institutional or ideological variables are W. D. Young, 
The Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF. 1932-1961. (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1967) and J. L. Granatstein, The 
Politics of Survival: The Conservative Party of Canada. 1939-1945. 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967).
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4"input" variables. The aim of this study is to redress 
partially this imbalance by analyzing leadership as a 
dependent rather than an independent variable in the 
political process. Therefore, by focusing on the selection 
of party leaders, analysis is directed at the ideological 
and institutional context, particularly the political party, 
in which leadership emerges. In this manner, party leaders 
are viewed as a response to influences fashioned by their 
institutional and ideological environment.
The selection of party leaders in the Liberal Party 
of Canada from 1919 to 1968 commends itself to a study of 
leadership in the above context. The characteristics of the 
party in this period which facilitate analysis derive from 
the relative stability of key variables involved in leadership 
selection - (1) the permanence of the national party 
convention as the mechanism of leadership selection.
4ln other words, interest has been focused on the 
leader* s capability of influencing the environment at the 
expense of attention to factors which have molded leadership 
end influenced its capabilities. An example of this approach 
resides in R. M. Dawson*s evaluation of the leadership of 
Prime Minister Mackenzie King: "Political leadership, in 
short, must always meet two tests: the ability to gain and 
stay in power, and the ability to use power once it has been 
gained." Dawson, R. M. "Mackenzie King as leader", in Party 
Politics in Canada. 2nd edition, ed. H. G. Thorbum. 
(Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1967) p. 129.
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(2) the relatively constant party situation, and (3) the 
continuity of leadership and leadership style in the party. 
The August 1919 convention which chose Mackenzie King was 
the archetype for selection of subsequent Liberal leaders. 
Unlike the Conservative party, which vacillated among 
convention, caucus and other procedures for leadership 
selection, the Liberal party remained faithful to the 
convention method. In 1948, Louis St. Laurent was selected 
from among three candidates to occupy the leadership. Both 
Mr. St. Laurent and L. B. Pearson, who won a virtual two- 
candidate race in August, 1958, were victorious on the first 
convention ballot. The selection of Pierre Elliott Trudeau 
in June of 1968 on the fourth ballot was the final occasion 
to date (April, 1971) at which the party convention was 
called upon to choose a party leader. Needless to say, 
the national party convention has been and remains the 
established mechanism for party leadership selection.
The period subsequent to 1919 is also significant 
for the Liberal party as it has maintained a relatively 
consolidated position in respect to the Canadian political 
and social systems. One can maintain that the collapse of 
the Unionist era ushered in a realignment of the Canadian 
party systen, whose essential features have persisted from
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1919 to the present. Thus, the party system has been 
dominated by the existence of two grand omnibus parties - 
Liberal and Conservative - whose ascendancy has been periodic­
ally qualified by third and fourth "splinter" parties.^ The 
federal Liberal party has consequently maintained a generally 
stable position in relation to other parties and to the 
social foundations of the party system. This stable 
position has included the virtual dominance of the Liberals 
as a governing party. In only 11 of the 50 years from 1919 
to 1968, has the Liberal party failed to form a government 
at the federal level,^
Over much of the period from 1919 to 1968, leader­
ship in the Liberal party has been notoriously stable and 
generally restrained in style. Flamboyance and instability 
of leadership, characteristic of the Canadian Conservative 
party, has been notably absent in the Liberal case. Only 
four leaders, as opposed to more than twice that number with 
the Conservatives, have existed in the Liberal party since 
1919, Moreover, there has occurred only infrequent
^See j, R. Mallory, "The Structure of Canadian Politics" 
in Thorbum. op. cit.. pp. 24-32,
&For details of ministries from 1919 to 1968, see P. G. 
Normandin, ed., The Canadian Parliamentary Guide. 1968 (Ottawa: 
Queen*s Printer, 1969), p. 21,
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challenges from followers to the continued tenure of Liberal
leaders. Mackenzie King himself functioned as party leader
for almost 30 years. Indeed, the dominance of Mr. King
since 1919 has been viewed as the paragon of Canadian
political leadership, according to the "brokerage" conception
of the country* s party and social systems. This passive
form of leadership style has been most succinctly expressed
by J, W. Pickersgill*s observation:
He was acutely conscious that political 
progress was possible only if public 
support was forthcoming, and he believed 
that nothing was so likely to set back a 
good cause as premature action. 8
The low-key leadership perfected by King after 1919 differed
from the more principled or doctrinaire form characteristic
of other leadership styles.^
F^. H. Underhill was a prime ezgonent of the virtues of 
"brokerage" leadership - the conciliation of many diverse 
demands: "The essential task of Canadian statesmanship is to 
discover the terms on which as many as possible of the
significant interest groups can be induced to work together in
a common policy...Mr. King’s life has been devoted to the 
restoration of a working national harmony of the two national 
communities (French and English) through a revived Liberal 
party". F. H. Underhill, In Search of Canadian Liberalism. 
(Toronto: Macmillan, 196077 PP* 127-129.
®J. W. Pickersgill, ed.. The Mackenzie King Record:
I. 1939-1944. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, I960) p.10.
^Former Liberal leader, Alexander Mackenzie, illustrated 
this form of leadership style, emphasizing principle rather 
than a more opportunistic approach: "My notion of the public
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
In the same manner, the leadership style of both Mr.
St. Laurent and Mr. Pearson has been seen as relatively
restrained and uncontroversial. Rather than as an innovator,
Mr. St. Laurent was viewed as "an executor or liquidator to
usher out the Mackenzie King era, not to usher in a new St.
Laurent era."^® As one observer described Mr. Pearson’s
approach to leadership:
Reacting magnificently was always more 
important than anticipating or reaching 
out for problems...light on both feet, 
ready to move in any direction...he saw 
power in Canadian society dispersed 
among competing institutions that always 
managed to balance each other, producing 
"the national interest" by osmosis. 11
As a rule, leadership in the Liberal party has been relatively
12passive rather than dynamic in character.
^man is that he should maintain sound principles, 
advocate them honestly, and trust to such principles working 
out a right solution. The Conservatives have had a lease of 
power, but they have had it by means no honest man can justify." 
A. Mackenzie, quoted in W. Buckingham and G. W. Ross, The 
Honourable Alexander Mackenzie: His Life and Times. (Toronto: 
Ross, 1892) p. 425. Significantly, Mackenzie’s form of leader­
ship coincided with a more doctrinal form of party. See S. P. 
Regenstreif, "The Liberal Party: A. Political Analysis". 
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1963) p.466,
^^Bggleston, Wilfred, "Appointing a Liquidator,
Saturday Night. August 14, 1948, p.4.
^iNewman, P. C., The Distemper of Our Times. (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart, 1968) p. 54.
l^Admittedly, however. Prime Minister Trudeau appears 
to be an exception to this pattern.
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Political Party And The Leadership Selection Process
The selection of leaders in the Liberal party can be 
assumed to occur within two systems of behaviour^^ - the 
leadership selection process and the political party. Although 
other systems may have a marginal inpact, these two are the 
most immediately related to the selection of party leaders.
The leadership selection process refers to behaviour 
which relates directly to the emergence of party leadership.
The variables involved in the leadership selection process 
of the party can be grouped for purposes of analysis into 
three concepts - (1) the formal and informal structure of
the mechanism of selection (2) the rules of the game applic­
able to participant behaviour and (3) the character of 
"preselection" operating in the party. The mechanism of 
selection refers to the institution, in the case of the 
Canadian Liberals - the national party convention, immediately 
responsible for the choice of leader. The patterns of 
behaviour characteristic of elites and non-elites operating 
within the leadership selection process as a whole constitute 
the prevailing rules of the game. Both the mechanism of
l^The concept of "system of behaviour" is derived from 
David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis. (Englewood 
Cliffs; Prentice-Hall, 1965Tpp. 23-34.
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8selection and rules of the game are primarily descriptive
concepts whose delineation in large measure indicates the
nature of the party selection process.
The character of preselection in the party is
indicated by those aspects descriptive of the leadership
selection process, but which do not stem from candidate
behaviour or from the structure of the mechanism of selection.
For exan^le, the number and characteristics of candidates
has profound influences on the form of leadership selection,
but is distinct from either candidate behaviour or the
convention structure. Thus, preselection is indicative
of a more subtle, prior process in the leadership selection
process, which substantially determines its manifest
character. Although less visible than the actual act of
selection, leadership also emerges in the context of the
wider performance of the institution as a whole, \diich
serves to project certain types of elites as potential leaders.
Leaders are always, covertly or overtly,
"preselected" by their supporters 
according to the situational needs of the 
group. Leadership is a nexus of need 
fulfillments that binds situational 
demands and group membership. 14
14Seligman, L. G., "Leadership; Political Aspects", in 
The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. D. L. Sills,
(New York; The Free Press, 1968), p. 108,
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In effect, the concept of preselection allows analysis to 
evaluate both the appearance and non-appearance of certain 
forms of behaviour in the manifest choice of leader.
The second system of behaviour relevant to the 
selection of leaders can be considered to coincide with the 
political party itself. Although other systems of behaviour, 
(the political and social), may influence leadership 
selection, the political party is assumed to be the system 
most immediately linked with the selection process. Since 
its functions and objectives extend beyond that of providing 
leadership for itself or for other systems,the political 
party must, however, be considered a more inclusive system 
of behaviour than the leadership selection process.
The nature of the leadership selection process in the 
Liberal party constitutes the dependent variable upon vÆiich
l^The analysis now considers problematic the fact that 
leadership candidates reveal an inordinate bias toward certain 
characteristics. Whereas, if behaviour and structure alone 
were considered problematical, these characteristics would be 
given. The argument is similar to that made against the study 
of power exclusively using public issues as data. The essential 
question is who or what sets the agenda prior to the mani­
festation of a contest. See P. Bachrach and M.S. Baratz, "Two 
Faces of Power" in Political Power, Community end Democracy, 
ed. E. Keynes and D, M, Ricci (Chicago; Rand-McNally, 1970*) p.195.
IGpor a catalogue of other suggested functions of 
parties, see John Meisel, "Recent Changes in Canadian Parties" 
in Thorbum. op. cit.. pp. 33-34.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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this analysis focuses. However, political party provides 
the immediate environment in which the selection process 
occurs. As such, it is the main independent variable which 
affects the nature of leadership selection. The influences 
of party derive from its two most basic features - party 
structure and party ideology. The ideology and structure of 
a political party provide the value and institutional 
environment within which the leadership selection process 
operates.
Diagram 1
Political Party And The Leadership Selection Process
Party
Structure
Party
Ideology
Political Party (Environment)
Leadership Selection Process
Preselection
Rules of the Game
Selection 
Mechani sm
Political Party(Environment)
Party
Leadership
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Consensus and Conflict in Leadership Selection
In analyzing the nature of leadership selection, the 
most central problem revolves around the manner in which 
conflict arising over the pursuit of the office of leader is 
reconciled with the consensus required for further collective 
action.
In a theoretical sense, the question of the relation­
ship of consensus to conflict with respect to the selection 
of leaders by the Canadian Liberals is most interesting. The 
Parliamentary nature of the Canadian governmental structure 
puts a priority on party consensus permitting unified, 
collective action; but the conplexity of Canadian political 
cleavages end omnibus nature of the major parties makes the 
achievement of this consensus a delicate task. Nonetheless, 
the performance of the Liberal party since 1919 has clearly
resolved this problem in favour of consensus and, consequently,
17of party success. In the light of this overall capability 
it is significant to explore the resolution of the problem 
in the context of one aspect of party activity-leadership 
selection.
l^As well as preventing internal schisms, the party has 
managed to attract political factions, such as the Progressives, 
into the party. See W. L. Morton, The Progressive Party in 
Canada. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950),
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Two forms of conflict between political actors may 
potentially arise in the process of leadership selection by 
the party conventions. The first involves the attempt by 
non-elites to control directly the leadership of the political 
party: the second features conflict between members of the 
elite over the occupancy of the o f f i c e . T o  the extent that 
the latter process involves appeals for support to non- 
elites,^^ both forms of conflict allow non-elites a measure 
of influence in the determination of party leadership. In 
this sense, both processes may be considered "democratic".
For a party to continue to function effectively, 
however, both forms of democratic conflict must be
^^The first constitutes a demand for equality. Several 
theorists have considered such demands for equality of control 
to.be utopian. The only practical substitute is therefore 
competition between elites for non-elite support, or "polyarchy". 
Despite "the drive a^ jay from equality of control in modem 
society...the democratic goal is still roughly and crudely 
approximated in the sense that non-leaders escercise a relatively 
high degree of control over leaders. The constellation of social 
processes that make this possible we call polyarchy." R.A. Dahl 
and Charles E. Lindblom Politics, Economics and Welfare. (New 
York: Harper, 1953) p. 275. For purposes of this paper, elites 
will be considered to consist of occupants of party or political 
office at the federal or provincial, rather than constituency 
level - for exanple, federal and provincial Parliamentary parties 
and Cabinets and national officers of extra-Parliamentary 
organizations.
l^According to S. S. Schattschneider, real conflict will 
continually be expanded in scope by appeals for support. See S.S. 
Schattschneider. The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of 
Democracy in America. (New York: Holt. Rinehaitand Winston,
r%ïï5 -------
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reconciled with the existence of an overriding consensus based
on the acceptance of wider objectives. With respect to the
selection of leaders by the Liberal party, it is therefore
valuable to explore the degree to v;Æiich conflict of a democratic
sort has existed, the extent to wîiich conflict has been limited
by the presence of a party consensus, and the nature of this
consensus. Moreover, it is consequently of great importance
to evaluate those instruments - the mechanism of selection
20and the structure end ideology of the party - which have 
regulated the amount of consensus and conflict appearing in 
the leadership selection process. The resolution of conflict 
and the establishment of consensus constitute the primary 
focus for the analysis of the leadership selection process in 
the Canadian Liberal party.
^^The confinement of causes of the degree of consensus 
or conflict in leadership selection to the nature of the 
Liberal Party and the structure of the leadership convention 
obviously discounts the role of other influences. Due to the 
historical nature of the study, for instance, the influence 
of secular cultural trends should not be ignored. However, to 
the degree such wider influences are significant, it is 
assumed they will be reflected in changes in the variables 
considered. For example, if a trend toward a more democratic 
political culture has existed in Canada from 1919 to 1968, 
there seems reason to assume it will be reflected in the 
party itself or in the structure of the convention. Indeed, 
there is evidence that such changes have occurred in the 
latter institutions, accounting perhaps for a cultural trend.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER II
THE NATIONAL PARTY CONVENTION AND LEADERSHIP SELECTION
The selection of party leaders by national convention 
is not characteristic of many political systems. In the 
United States, however, this procedure has been utilized for 
the selection of presidential nominees since the mid­
nineteenth century.1 As presidential candidates these 
nominees approached the status of leaders within the party, 
although theoretically their leadership was not equivalent 
to that exercised in the British form of governmental and 
party system. In this type of political system, prevailing 
in the United Kingdom and the Dominions, the appointment of 
party leaders remained under the control of parliamentary 
figures operating within the legislative caucus.
The first exception to the caucus control of leader­
ship in British Cabinet-Parliamentary systems was the 1893 
convention of the Canadian Liberal Party. Although conventions
^See V. 0. Key. Politics. Parties and Pressure Groups. 
5th edition. (New York: Crowell, 1964) p. 397. For a history 
of American conventions, see P. T. David, et. al., The Politics 
of National Party Conventions (New York: Vintage, 1964).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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2
of Canadian parties occurred prior to 1893, the 1893
3
gathering was the first convention to be widely representative 
and to concern itself, albeit briefly, with the question of 
party leadership. Conpared to the American conventions of 
the period and later Canadian conventions, however, the 
leadership question was only a minor consideration in 1893. 
Certainly there was no idea of deposing the reigning leader.
Sir Wilfrid Laurier, and, in the conduct of the convention, 
priority was given to policy and organizational affairs.* 
Indeed, the only official act of the convention in regards 
to leadership was to present at the last session a "resolution 
of confidence" in Laurier, which was hastily carried in the 
early hours of the morning.^
2 The doctrinal predecessors of the Liberals, the Grits, 
held the first "national" (1859) convention in Canada, See 
Elwood P. Jones, "Ephemeral Conpromise: The Great Reform 
Convention Revisited" Journal of Canadian Studies. Ill (February, 
1968), 21 - 28, and G, W. Brown, **The Grit Party and the Great 
Reform Convention of 1859" Canadian Historical Review. XXIV 
(September, 1953), 245-265.
^See J. W. Lederle, "The National Organization of 
Liberal and Conservative Parties in Canada". (Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Michigan, 1942), p. 58.
^Indeed, the convention was so representative that 
delegate credentials were often unchecked. See J. W. Lederle,
"The Liberal Convention of 1893" Canadian Joumal of Economics 
and Political Science. XVI. (February, 1950), 46,
^The resolution stated; "That this convention desires 
to express its entire confidence in the leadership of the 
Honourable Wilfrid Laurier and its admiration of his brilliant
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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In view of the characteristics of the 1893 convention, 
the 1919 convention of the Liberal Party can be considered 
the original prototype of national leadership conventions in 
Canada. Due to the death of Laurier and the unstable 
nature of the party system following the Unionist period, the 
convention of 1919 featured a serious struggle over the 
succession to Laurier's leadership of the party. Although 
the questions of party organization and program as well as 
leadership were the official purposes of the convention,^ 
the latter issue was, in reality, paramount. In this sense 
the 1919 convention patterned the succeeding conventions of 
1948, 1958 and 1968. Similar to 1919, the later conventions 
all featured leadership contests between twro or more 
candidates, which were decided by a majority ballot of 
delegates.
Perhaps the most distinguishing characteristic of
^eloquence, his endearing personal qualities and his 
broad and statesmanlike utterances upon the public questions 
of the day." The Official Report of the Liberal Convention. 
(Toronto; The Liberal Party of Canada 1893), p. 141.
^The Liberal Party of Canada. The National Liberal 
Convention. Ottawa. August 5. 6. 7. 1919; The Story of the 
Convention and The Report of its Proceedings. (Ottawa, 1919) 
p. 6. Hereafter, referred to as The National Liberal 
Convention. (1919).
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the history of contests, in contrast to their United States 
counterparts, is their irregular occurrence. Only four 
leadership conventions have been held this century. Between 
these gatherings the minimum interval was a decade; but the 
period between the King and St. Laurent conventions was 
almost 29 years.
The party* s relationship to government has been 
assumed to affect the conduct of national conventions. In 
the United States, whether a party is "in" or "out" of power 
at the federal level has been considered a significant 
influence on convention behaviour.? 1%^ the Canadian Liberal
Party only one leadership convention - 1948 - has been 
conducted in a period when the party actually possessed a 
clear majority in the lower House, In 1968, the government 
of Mr. Pearson held only a plurality of the Commons* seats.
Both in 1919 and 1958, the party constituted the Official 
Opposition at the federal level, although Liberal govern­
ments were present in the provinces.®
7See David, et. al., o£. cit.. pp. 82-125,
8 The number of Liberal governments in the provinces has 
varied from a high of 6 in 1919 to a low of 2 in 1958. In 1948 
and 1968 provincial Liberal parties formed the government or 
participated in a governmental coalition in four provinces. 
Liberal-Progressive governments were present in Manitoba in 
both 1948 and 1958. See The Canadian Parli^entary Guide. 1919. 
ed. E. J, Chambers (Ottawa: Mortimer, 1919) end P.' G. Norraandin, 
ed. The Canadian Parliamentary Guides for 1948. 1958 and 1968. 
(Ottawa; Queen* s Printer, 1948, 1958 and 1968.)
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The mere fact of being a Government or Opposition 
Party has not been clearly related to the varying patterns 
of conpetition in leadership contests. The highest degrees 
of conpetition, measured by the number of candidates and 
ballots, have occurred in 1919 and 1968, while the lowest
Q
degrees were present in 1948 and 1958,
In the Liberal Party, more Clearly related to the 
degree of leadership conpetition in convention were the 
prevailing party outlooks on each occasion. In this respect 
a distinction can be made between the Opposition periods 
of 1919 and 1958, In the former case the party was 
considered truly distant from the immediate possibility 
of forming a federal government. As well as having remained 
in Opposition since 1911 and having suffered the defection 
of the Liberal-Unionists,^® a realistic awareness of the 
party* s position was prevalent within the party, as the
*See Table 1
lOAlthough possessing some 62 Quebec seats after the 
1917 election, "Laurier" Liberals retained only 8 seats in 
Ontario and a mere 2 in the four western provinces. None- 
the-less, the party received more than a third of the votes 
cast in Ontario and Alberta and never less than 20% in the 
other provinces. See H, G. Thorbum, ed.. Party Politics 
in Canada. 2nd edition, (Scarborough; Prentice-Hall, 1967) 
pp. 218-224,
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prospective leader, Mr. King, observed:
There seems to be a call to me at this time, 
the need for leadership. It was never greater.
The party* s fortunes are at a low ebb, the 
lowest for many years. 11
In retrospect, the Prime Minister confirmed and elaborated
upon this view:
...a party which had been out of office for 
eight years; a party which had become 
sharply divided at a time of vmr; a party 
which had lost the great chieftain...; a 
party which was in the minority in both 
houses of Parliament. In its ranks, there 
were still enmities and divisions. A third 
political party,..was a rival of the Liberal 
Party for power, 12
The 1958 situation was substantially different. 
Although in Opposition after the 1957 general election, the 
Liberals were only some 7 seats short of the government* s 
total of 112 and had outpolled the Conservatives in terras of 
popular votes - 41 percent to 39 percent.^® As a result, the
llQuoted in R, M, Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King:
A Political Biography. 1874-1923 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1958) p, 10,
^^King, W, L, M,, Address by the Right Honourable W, L,
Mackenzie King to the 1948 National Liberal Convention on Years 
of Leadership - and Reasons for Retirement as Leader of the 
Party. (Ottaîm: National Liberal Federation, 1948FT, 11,
ISstatistics found in the appendix to Thorbum, 
op, cit,. p, 225,
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atmosphere of the convention proceedings differed consider--
ably from 1919. According to one observer of the gathering
...a casual bystander could be forgiven if he 
concluded that he was attending the convention 
of a party which had recently won, not lost, 
a general election. 14
In his closing address as leader, Mr. Pearson accurately
portrayed the party optimism and its causes;
With the right policies and the right 
organization we will soon be returned to 
office again...Our task is to bring 
confidence and stability out of the pre­
sent confusion and uncertainty; to bring 
back steadiness and faith where there is 
now nervousness and fear...The Conservative 
government is talking now of what they are 
pleased to call a "pause" in our national 
development.,.How long is it to be before 
we get back on the Liberal road of full 
employment and a rising standard of living, 
the road this country has travelled ever 
since the war? 15
Similarly, the party*s situation at the "government"
conventions of 1948 and 1968 can be distinguished. As well
as possessing a vast majority of Parliamentary representation
16and popular votes, the Liberal Party in 1948 remained under
Ward, "The Liberals in Convention", in Thorbum, 
op* cib'. P» 225.
15The Liberal Party of Canada. Report of the Proceedings 
of the National Liberal Convention. (Ottawa; National Liberal 
Federation, 1948) pp. 251-253. Henceforth to be referred to as 
Report of the Proceedings (1948).
l®See Thorbum, o£. cit.. p. 225,
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the guidance of a leader who had occupied the post of 
Prime Minister, uninterrupted, for 13 years. The more 
partisan challenge of the left-wing C.C.F. party had been 
replaced in significance by the threat of international 
communism. Except for the protest of C. G. Power, a former 
Minister, there seemed little evidence of dissatisfaction 
with the prevailing status of the party.
In 1968, however, the Party formed only a slim 
minority government, whose position was rendered even more 
tenuous by the government defeat of February 19, 1968. 
Electorally, the Party was challenged by the popularity of 
the new Conservative leader, as interpreted by the public 
opinion polls,Moreover, among the established figures in 
the party, no individual seemed adequate to bolster the 
party's prospects. Although Mr. Trudeau's attraction as a 
candidate was his expected electoral appeal, he did not 
represent an outstanding party figure as was Mr. St. Laurent 
and Mr. Pearson on prior occasions. As a result, in the 1968 
situation of the Liberal Party, the "serene consensus", as
^^This was measured both in terms of the public* s view 
of Stanfield as a leadership choice - 61% felt it was a "good" 
choice - and the increased popularity of the Progressive 
Conservatives as cougared to the Liberals - 43 to 34% in October 
of 1967. See The Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, Public 
Opinion News Service. (Toronto, October 25 and 28, 1967X1
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one writer has termed it, "that had so smoothly bestowed the 
Liberal leadership on Lester Pearson (and on Louis St. Laurent 
before him) was conspicuously absent."^®
The Structure of National Leadership Conventions
The leadership conventions of the Liberal party have 
possessed a great similarity of structure, despite their 
infrequent occurrence. Although leadership succession has, 
in reality, constituted the focus of the national conventions 
from 1919 to 1968 (except 1966), only at the 1968 convention 
did it represent the sole official purpose for the event.
The former three conventions were called upon to entertain 
organizational and platform considerations of the party, in 
addition to deciding the contest for l e a d e r s h i p . Therefore, 
the necessity of leadership selection incidentally provided 
the opportunity for a gathering of party membership to 
discuss other party i s s u e s . However, the selection of a 
party leader has constituted the real basis for the appearance
1®P. C. Newman, The Distemper of Our Times. (Toronto; 
McClelland and Stewart, 1969), p. 436. As shall be noted below, 
this previous ’’consensus" was primarily fostered by the 
Cabinet elite or past leader.
19See Report of the Proceedings of the National Liberal 
Convention. (Ottawa; N.L.F. 1958) p. 1.8; Report of the 
Proceedings of the National Liberal Convention (1948). bp. clt.. 
p. 14; and The National Liberal Convention (1919). op. cit., p.6.
^^The long-time political organizer of the Liberal Party, 
Senator "Chubby" Power, has asserted this advantage of party 
conventions; "The greatest aid to part organization that comes
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of the national party convention. The absence of any
additional national party conventions prior to 1960
illustrates this point and also the relatively low priority
given to "grass roots" determination of party organization
and platform once the question of leadership selection has
been settled.
The role of the national party convention in the
determination of party policy has been an indirect, minor one.
Although the leadership conventions from 1919 to 1958
simultaneously created a party platform, its lack of influence
on party policy has been defined by Mr. King*s statement at
the 1919 gathering:
I consider the platform as a chart to guide 
me and with the advice of the best minds in 
the Liberal Party as a compass, will seek to 
steer the right course. 21
20from conventions arises from the opportunities for 
personal contacts. The meeting of a large number of persons 
actively engaged in the same kind of work, the acquaintances 
formed, and, above all, the exchange of information and 
experience, are of great value." Power, C. G., A Party 
Politician: The Memoirs of Chubby Power, ed. Norman Ward. 
(Toronto: Macmillan, 1966J p. 372. This opinion seems to be 
concurred in by at least one analysis of the Canadian party 
system: "This binding together of party activists, even at such 
rare intervals, in the performance of a crucial function adds 
significantly to party cohesion and facilitates the task of 
party leadership." F. C. Engelmann and M. A. Schwartz, Political 
Parties and the Canadian Social Structure. (Scarborough: 
PrenticerHall, 1967), p. 192.
■^Quoted in S. P. Regenstreif, "The Liberal Party of 
Canada: A Political Analysis". (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Cornell University, 1963), p. 207.
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The same philosophy was echoed by Mr. Pearson at the 1958 
convention:
Our task is to bring confidence and stability 
out of the present confusion and uncertainty;
...The chart to guide us in this task has been 
established by the resolution you have adopted. 22
In the 1960*s, the frequency of conventions reviewing party
policies increased considerably. Nonetheless, despite
desires among some activists that the party become "a vehicle
for dCTiocracy" the prerogatives of the parliamentary party
remained, according to Prime Minister Pearson, essentially
the same. In speaking of the "freedom" present at the 1966
biennial policy conference, he announced
You have qmployed this freedom with a boldness and 
a sense of responsibility that has renewed the 
strength and vigour of our party. Your resolutions 
will be significant end ia^ortant guides for 
government (Translation)...The resolutions that 
have been adopted will be our guide in the days 
ahead. 23
Despite party assertions that the attitudes of the 
present leader are somewhat different from his predecessors,
Report of the Proceedings (1958), cit.. , p.251
23Proceedings of Plenary Sessions: National Meeting 1966 
and Liberal Party Conference (Ottawa; N.L.F. , 1966) p. 47.
^^According to recent claims, the Liberal party is 
increasingly committed to becoming "an effective participatory 
vehicle" in which "iimroved participatory techniques...to make 
more effective the role of the individual in all forms of 
political organization" are to be implemented. See Liberal 
Party of Canada. Study Group on Participation. The Politics of 
Participation: A Progress Report. (Ottawa: National Liberal 
Federation, 1970), pp. 2, 3 and 12.
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the relationship between party convention and ultimate party 
policy, has remained consistent with the "cadre" nature of 
the Liberal P a r t y . A t  the party policy convention of 
1970, the "responsibility" of the party elite as government 
took precedence over the in^lementation of members* resolutions 
on policy issues.
Similar to the historic pattern of elite control of 
policy determination in the party, the relationship of 
leadership to conventions has also reflected the influence of 
the Parliamentary party. Since 1893, the structure and 
occurrence of the leadership convention has not been determined 
independent of the power of the parliamentary elite of the 
party or of the perquisites of the party leader, J. W. Lederle
25in other words, policy has remained a prerogative of 
the elected party elites. According to Maurice Duverger, the 
essence of the "cadre" party is its structure which resembles 
"the grouping of notabilities for the preparation of 
elections, conducting campaigns and maintaining contacts 
with the candidates." Historically, the Liberal Party has 
resembled this form of party structure. See M. Duverger, 
Political Parties (London: Methuen, 1954) p. 64.
2®The present leader considered some resolutions 
at the 1970 policy convention "for study" and for future 
implementation, while the government "should consider ways and 
means to study the balance of...resolutions." Letter from 
Prime Minister Trudeau to Miss Denise Howe, made public by the 
National Liberal Federation, p.3.
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has pointed out the rigorous framework imposed by the 
parliamentary hierarchy on the conduct of the 1893 
convention.Although the later conventions were more 
"open" - in terms of increased representation and the pre­
sence of candidates - than the 1893 archetype, at no time 
was the rule of parliamentary elites abrogated. Thus, the 
preparations for a second party convention were initiated 
by Sir Wilfrid Laurier in 1 9 1 8 . In 1919, following Laurier*s 
death, the parliamentary Liberal caucus appointed a "committee 
of management" under the stewardship of James A. Robb, a 
former Cabinet Minister, to conduct the affairs of the party, 
including the provision of a national leadership convention.
Some 14 Liberal M.P.*s, including the House Leader, D, D. 
Mackenzie, constituted this c o m m i t t e e . T h e  actual establish­
ment of the convention was under the supervision of a 
National Liberal Convention Committee of 23 members. The 
committee was completely formed from Parliamentary elites 
- 15 of which were federal M.P.* s or Senators appointed by the 
House Leader and the remainder representatives of the
^^According to J. W. Lederle, "...in organizing the body 
for business and subsequently in the discussing of policy 
resolutions, the fine hand of the party leader and his cohorts 
was omnipresent." Lederle, "The Liberal Convention of 1893", 
op. cit., p. 50.
28&eport of the Proceedings (1948), cit.. p. 2.
^^The Globe (Toronto). February 25, 1919.
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Parliamentary elite in 8 of the 9 provinces.
As the extra-parliamentary structure of the party
grew in significance, - witnessed by the creation of the
National Liberal Federation in 1932 - its participation in
the procedure leading to the leadership convention was
recognized. Thus, a share in the responsibility for the
organization of the 1948, (and subsequent conventions),
rested with the National Liberal Federation and its
officers. However, the essential control of the convention
remained within the Parliamentary party. For instance, the
decision to call a leadership convention was synonomous
with Mr. King’s decision to retire, which was expressed to
a dinner of the National Executive Committee on January 20,
301948. Moreover, the consultations of Prime Minister King
were basically confined to the elite of his Cabinet - St.
Laurent, Martin and Pearson - rather than extended to include
the party president, J. Gordon Fogo, or other extra-
31parliamentary figures.
The leader’s initiative in prompting the calling of 
a leadership convention remained characteristic of Mr. St.
^Qpeport of the Proceedings (1948), o£. cit.. p. 5,
31see Dale C. Thomson, Louis St. Laurent; Canadian. 
(Toronto; Macmillan, 1967), p. 216.
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Laurent’s departure as leader in 1958. The desire of the
former Prime Minister was communicated to the National
Liberal Federation’s President in September of 1957;
...I have come to the conclusion that I no 
longer have the vigour and energy to lead 
the party through a general election campaign 
...Accordingly may I request you take the 
necessary steps to organize a national 
convention of our party at an appropriate place 
and time. 32
As in 1948, final arrangements were the responsibility of a 
joint committee of 10 - 5 representatives each from the
qo
parliamentary caucus and the Federation. The actual 
organization of the convention was further delegated to a 
National Convention Committee and Convention Organization 
Committee. The latter committee’s 38 members were conq>osed 
of some 18 Parliamentary figures, although the committee 
was chaired by the Federation president, Duncan K. MacTavish.
In the former committee (45 members) were included 8 members 
of provincial legislatures and 4 occupants of federal 
Parliamentary seats. A further subdivision into subcommittees 
concluded the basic structures preparing the way for the 
leadership convention.®^
®^Report of the Proceedings (1958), op. cit.. p. 15. 
33lbid.. p. 17; and Proceedings (1948), op. cit.. p. 14. 
3^Report of the Proceedings (1958), op. cit.. pp.I.10-11,
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Despite the extensive machinery established prior
to the 1919, 1948 and 1958 conventions, the initiation of
this machinery remained the constitutional prerogative of
the Parliamentary leader. The existence of this prerogative
was especially significant, given the possible status of
the party leader as head of government, and therefore as an
agent responsible to the populace at large rather than
to the party. In the traditional view of this situation
expressed by Duverger;
...democracy requires that parliamentary 
representatives should take precedence 
over party leaders (extra parliamentary) 
and the members of the electorate over 
the members of the party. 35
The recognition of this principle - to some extent - is
testified to by Prime Minister King*s comments on his calling
of the 1948 leadership convention;
I said nothing of the position of Prime 
Minister I had the best of reason for 
this. The office of Prime Minister is 
not one in the gift of a political party.
It is the highest office in the gift of 
the Crown...A Prime Minister is not 
responsible to a party organization or 
to a political party; he is responsible 
to Parliament and through Parliament to 
the people of the country as a whole. 36
®®Duverger, op. cit.. p. 182. 
3®King, op. cit., p. 7.
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In this respect, the position of Mr. St. Laurent in
1958 was quite different. Due to the 1957 electoral defeat
of the Liberals, the leader did not possess the constitutional
or political prerogatives of the office of Prime Minister,
This was perhaps one reason for the appearance of pressures
urging Mr. St. Laurent*s retirement.®^
The context of Prime Minister Pearson* s retirement
from the party leadership also differed, in a constitutional
sense, from that of his predecessors. The principle of party
gatherings at regular intervals for purposes of reviewing
party policy had been extended to the question of leadership
by a resolution carried at the 1966 policy conference and
adopted in the party constitution:
A resolution calling for a Leadership Convention 
shall be placed automatically on the Agenda of 
the Biennial Convention next following a Federal 
General Election. If such resolution is adopted 
by secret ballot the Executive Committee shall 
call a Leadership Convention to take place 
within one year. 38
37%e day prior to the leader* s retirement the conference 
of Ontario Young Liberals called for a federal leadership 
convention. See G. Hamilton, "Young Liberals to Press for 
Convention" The Globe and Mail (Toronto) September 6, 1957, 
Ebqsectations of Mr. St. Laurent* s withdrawal had apparently 
been present for some time. See The Globe and Mail (Toronto) 
September 4, 1957 , The private pressures are described
by Thomson, op. cit.. p. 524.
33proceedingsof Plenary Sessions (1966), op. cit.. p. 12 
and The Liberal Party of Canada. Constitution. (Ottawa, 1966), 
Clause 9, Section H.
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Apparently, if the resolution was to be rigidly enforced as 
part of the party constitution, the leader*s prerogatives on 
the question of leadership succession would be substantially 
reduced.
Events prior to Mr. Pearson* s retirement in 1968 
allowed no application of the provisions of the 1966 
resolution. In practice, the withdrawal of Prime Minister 
Pearson and his personal control of the initiation of a 
leadership convention did not markedly differ from those of 
his predecessors. The ultimate decision, or authority, in 
his retirement was the leader* s oim. Prior to the day in 
which his intending resignation was preferred to the public,
Mr. Pearson* s intentions were unknown to the Cabinet, National 
Liberal Federation officials, and key political a d v i s o r s .  
Certainly, political factors were no doubt involved in the 
Prime Minister* s decision, including the appointment of a 
new Conservative leader; but there was a conplete absence of 
the overt political pressure applied in the case of the other 
p a r t y , o r  in the resignation of Mr. St. Laurent in 1958.
39see Donald Peacock, Journey to Power (Toronto:
Ryerson, 1968), pp. 110-111.
40see Martin Sullivan, Mandate *68. (Toronto: Doubleday, 
1968) pp. 91-92, 121-130. For a biased, but more complete view 
of the attacks on Mr. Diefenbaker*s leadership, see Robert C. 
Coates, The i Night of the Knives. (Fredericton: Brunswick, 1968)
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The actual record of the national leadership 
convention in the Liberal Party seems to differ in this 
respect from conceptions of the process as an instrument of 
intraparty democracy. If democracy indicates control by 
non-elites or even accountability of leader to non-elites 
at specific designated intervals, the Liberal leadership 
selection process has not functioned democratically. In a 
sense, however, the party convention has maintained an aura 
of democratic legitimacy around the leadership of the party. 
Apparently, Mackenzie King was prone to remind his Cabinet 
colleagues of the wider nature of his party leadership 
constituency,^^ Thus, the very fact that non-elites 
participated in the selection of party leader, regardless of 
elite control of the time and extent of this control, served 
to democratize, (and hence in some respects to legitimize), 
the party leadership process.
Delegates and Representation
The essential instrument for the delegate* s parti­
cipation in the selection process is the leadership ballot.
^See D. V. Smiley, "The National Party Convention in 
Canada: A Preliminary Analysis", Canadian Journal of Political 
Science. I (March, 1968), 382; and Lederle~ *'The National 
Organization...", op. cit.. p. 63.
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Paradoxically, the form of balloting - secret, individual 
voting - utilized in Liberal Conventions, unlike the United 
States* example, has encouraged a great degree of individual 
free choice. The individual delegate seemingly performed as 
a free agent, since he was bound by no primary elections 
and, indeed, by no overt political "pressure" of any sort 
due to the secret nature of the ballot. If this had indeed 
been practically as well as theoretically the case, the 
relatively high degree of stability in the leadership voting 
- 2 of 4 contests decided on the first ballot - is quite 
exceptional,
The characteristics of delegates to Liberal leader­
ship conventions are significant in view of this exceptional 
stability. The composition of delegates to Liberal leadership 
conventions from 1919 to 1958 was such that Parliamentary 
elites continually retained a substantial degree of parti­
cipation in the conduct of leadership selection. The actual 
formulas providing for representation at leadership conventions 
have thus been quite similar, being arranged:
Following the plans adopted in the prior 
National Conventions...and having regard to 
subsequent developments. 42
42Report of the Proceedings. (1958) and Report of the 
Proceedings (1948), o£. cit.. p.I.8 and p. 14.
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Except for the inclusion of ten rather than nine 
provinces and for the addition of the executive committee 
of the Canadian University Liberal Federation, the formulas 
for 1958 and 1948 were identical:
1. All the Liberal members of the Privy 
Council, of the Senate and of the House 
of Commons, and where any constituency is 
not now represented in Parliament by an 
adherent of the Liberal Party, the Liberal 
candidate defeated in the last general 
election, or if a new Liberal candidate 
has been nominated... such new candidate.
2. The leaders of the Liberal Party in the 
ten provinces of Canada.
3. All members of the Executive Committees of 
of the National Liberal Federation of 
Canada, the National Federation of Liberal 
Women of Canada, and the Canadian University 
Liberal Federation.
4. The presidents and two other officers of 
each of the ten Provincial Liberal 
associations; the Provincial organizations 
of Liberal Women, the Provincial organ­
izations of Young Liberals; and the president 
and two other officers of each of the 
university Liberal clubs in Canada.
5. Three delegates from each federal electoral 
district...In the case of Constituencies 
having two Parliamentary representatives 
six delegates will be selected.
6. The Liberal members of each provincial 
assembly and the defeated Liberal candid- 
dates at the last provincial assembly 
election in each province or new candidates 
nominated, acting jointly, shall have the 
right to select from among themselves a 
number of delegates equal to one-fourth of 
the total membership of each provincial 
assembly. 43
R^eport of the Proceedings (1958). op. cit:.. pp. 1.8-1,9
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The formulas consequently allowed Parliamentary elites to 
maintain a high degree of participation in the leadership 
conventions of 1948 and 1958. In the former, 307 of 1,302 
delegates and, in the latter, 351 of 1,534 delegates were 
present members of, former members of, or candidates for, 
the federal Parliament. Another 140 in 1948 and 144 in 1958 
were members of the Parliamentary elites of provincial parties.^4 
Thus, in each of the leadership conventions of 1948 and 1958, 
fully one-third of the delegate representation was attached 
to the Parliamentary level of party activity as either 
members or candidates.
The significance of the representational formula 
resides in the preponderance of Parliamentary over non­
par liamentary elites - officers of affiliated associations 
above the constituency level. The latter category constituted 
less than 10 percent of the total representation at both the 
1948 and 1958 conventions. In 1919 this characteristic of 
delegate representation was reinforced by confining the 
participation of extra-Parliamentary heads of affiliated 
associations to those of the nine provincial organizations.4®
44Report of the Proceedings (1958), pp. cit., p.I.16; 
and Report~of thenFroceeHlngs (1948). op. cit., p. 25.
45see The National Liberal Convention, op. cit.. p. 6.
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Furthermore, the numbers of federal Parliamentary elites
qualified to attend the 1919 convention were extended to
include all those members "who desire to cooperate with the
Liberal Party", as well as Liberal members and defeated
46
candidates per se.
The signficance of the legislative party at the 
three earlier conventions clearly placed a high priority 
on the goodwill of Parliamentary members for the achievement 
of success by a leadership candidate. In reality, the 
successful leadership candidates have received a preponderant 
amount of support from federal Parliamentary members. How­
ever, the significance of the Parliamentary elite in leader­
ship selection extended beyond that of its numbers alone.
In particular, the behaviour of constituency delegates, 
who have formed the majority of votes at each convention 
since 1919, is not necessarily determined independent of 
Parliamentary figures. As Senator Power relates of the 
process of selecting constituency delegates;
The weakness in this is that very often the 
constituency delegates are the choice of 
the federal member of Parliament and reflect 
his views and vote as he directs. 47
National Liberal Convention, op. cit.. p. 6. 
47power, op. cit., p. 371,
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The influence of the Parliamentary party over constituency
delegates derived from at least two factors - the method of
choosing constituency delegates and the relative lack of
information concerning leadership accruing to the non-
Parliamentary delegate.
The accreditation of constituency delegates
depended upon their election at a local party convention.
In each federal electoral district a meeting 
shall be called...for the election by a 
majority of the votes of those present at the 
meeting, of the number of delegates to which 
the constituency is entitled. 48
However, the responsibility for the organization of the
convention resided mainly with the respective federal M.P,
or defeated candidate. Although the action of the defeated
candidate or member of Parliament was undertaken in
conjunction with the local constituency and provincial
associations, the latter* s influence was clearly less direct.
The situation offered the opportunity of affecting the quality
of delegates much more to the federal Parliamentary members
or defeated candidates, than to other elite groups, such as
the extra-Parliamentary party or provincial organizations.
The impact of the legislative member on the views of
4®Pveport of the Proceedings (1948), op. cit.. p.16; 
Report of the Proceedings (1958). op. cit.. p. 1.9. See also 
The National Liberal Convention (1919), op. cit.. p. 7,
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constituency delegates was enhanced by his frequent monopoly
on political information. In conventions prior to 1968, the
extent of candidate campaigns and the importance of the mass
media were much less pronounced than in contemporary politics
of leadership. Furthermore, the knowledge of leadership
candidates and issues, as well as party affairs in general,
were often obscured in favour of enphasis on electoral
prospects and party unity. In the convention of 1948 one
constituency delegate lamented;
We are here to prepare a platform.,.We don't 
need pep talks. We want adequate time in which 
to discuss what is going into that platform. 49
Party gatherings offered little opportunity for constituency
delegates to ascertain even the basic dynamics of the party.
According to Senator Power;
...the delegates usually return home with 
little or no idea of the issues to be put 
before the people of the country. 50
In view of this situation and of the nature of the constituency
party, which has tended to feature relatively little independent
presentation of information or discussion of issues, the status
of the legislator became particularly significant. The member
49J. R, McLaren, quoted in "Delegates Want Good Platform, 
Not Pep Talks", The Globe and Mail (Toronto) August 6, 1948.
30power, op. cit.. p. 370.
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of the Parliamentary party thus became a central focus for 
the dissemination of information and opinion within the 
constituency. The actual extent to which the member has 
functioned as an "opinion leader" among his respective 
constituency delegates in the first three leadership 
conventions is of course presently indeterminable. However it 
is not unreasonable to maintain that his potential influence on 
delegate behaviour greatly exceeded that possessed by other 
elites.
A change in representation at the 1968 leadership 
convention favoured an increase in the number of constituency 
delegates.
Six delegates from each federal electoral 
district at least one of whom shall be a 
Liberal woman and one a Young Liberal, 
and alternates, who shall be elected at a 
local meeting, to be called for that purpose.^1
The relative decline of representation of Parliamentary elites
and the realignment of constituency boundaries in 1966 -
reducing the influence of Parliamentary members on constituency
members - has been seen as contributory to the more competitive
leadership contest in 1968. However, the freedom of the
individual delegate is not necessarily proved by increased
competition, since the latter could equally well result
31Constitution. op. cit., Clause 9, Section D.8.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
41
from increased conflict between elites. The significant 
featiire of delegate representation at the 1968 convention, 
as with its predecessors, was the commitment - through
52prolonged party membership and occupancy of party offices - 
of a great majority of delegates to the existing party frame­
work.
The Role of the Party Leader
Although the power of non-elites in the leadership 
selection process has been limited by the nature of delegate 
representation to party conventions and by the lack of 
leadership accountability at designated periods, a further 
qualification was enforced by the nature of the elites 
contesting for the possession of the party leadership. 
Consequently, the effectiveness of non-elites in the conduct 
of the political system is not necessarily measured by their 
actual participation in elite roles but by the degree to 
which their activity influences the award of elite roles to 
different sets of conpetitive elites. In the latter 
situation, the existence of a clearly defined elite group or
32one survey of the 1968 convention reports over 50 
percent of delegates were party members for at least 10 years. 
See C. R. Santos, "Some Collective Characteristics of Delegates 
to the 1968 Liberal Party Leadership Convention", Canadian 
Journal of Political Science. Ill,(June, 1970), 301.
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a "counter elite" is a prerequisite of this influence.
In the leadership selection process of the Liberal 
Party the success of a clearly defined "counter-elite" has 
been infrequent. As a result, there has not appeared a 
serious discontinuity in leadership succession in the party. 
This continuity in party leadership is evidenced by the 
positive relationships established between past and present 
leaders. Moreover, the characteristics of leadership 
candidates at conventions indicate a relative similarity 
of elites - and therefore the absence of alternative or 
dissimilar elites - in terms of their backgrounds in 
political institutions,^^ Both these characteristics have 
coincided with the absence of facilities, (the form of 
balloting excluded), conducive to competition among alternative 
elites for the support of non-elites, such as the frequent 
use of pre-convention campaigns and of canpaign organizations 
or the presentation of issues to the non-elites through the 
promulgation of alternative platforms or philosophies.
The dominant contribution to the inpotence of "counter­
elites" in the leadership selection process of the Liberal 
Party has been the strong influence of the past leader,
53see Tables 2 to 4
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One source of this influence lias been the tendency of the 
Liberal Party to venerate its great leaders - Laurier in 1919, 
King and Laurier in 1948, and in 1958 St. Laurent as well.
As a symbol of the party and its success the party chief 
was regarded xd.th deference by many party members. In the 
case of Mackenzie King, even the most dispassionate parti­
cipant in the 1948 convention was not unaware of this 
phenomenon;
We Liberals spoke of Mackenzie King with a 
mixture of wonder and uneasiness, but 
sparingly. He was less a person, more a 
presence. To the Liberal Party he had become 
a familiar mystery - like Communion wine - to 
be seen, partaken of, believed in, never 
fully understood; King conjured visions of 
mystical powers, eternal triumph, and an 
omnipotence beyond the ken of ordinary men 
,,,one could end a conversation by beginning 
to talk about him, 54
It is thus not unlikely that the considerable material
resources and political skills of the party leader were
enhanced by this prestige.
The significance of the former leader in the selection
of his successor was based on material as well as symbolic
considerations. In remarking on Mr, King’s influence at the
^^Dalton Canp, Gentlemen. Players and Politicians, 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970), p, 1,
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1948 leadership convention, a western journalist stressed
the considerable impact of the Prime Mini ster*s control of
elements of party patronage, including the occupation of
Senatorial posts.
These hopeful candidates for 13 vacancies 
in the Upper Chamber point up an over­
looked fact...The cardinal factor is that 
the Right Honourable William Lyon Mackenzie 
King is still the Prime Minister.. .Myone 
who leaves Mr. King out of his calculations 
has omitted the principal factor of 
prophetical wisdom. 55
Although publicly uncommitted to any candidate, there seems
little reason to doubt the many reports that Prime Minister
King privately exerted his influence in favour of Mr. St.
Laurent’s candidacy. The most obvious exanple was King’s
encouragement of Cabinet Ministers to enter initially the
nominations for the leadership and then to withdraw in
favour of St. Laurent.^^ The fact that his tenure of the
Prime Minister* s office was not concluded immediately
after the choice of his successor, (similar to Prime
55"King Favours St. Laurent; Prospective Liberal 
Senators Eye 13 Vacancies as Convention Nears", Winnipeg Free 
Press, August 2, 1948.
56see M. King, The Mackenzie King Record; IV. 1947-1948. 
ed. J, W. Pickersgill and D, F. Forster. (Toronto; University 
of Toronto Press, 1970) p. 358, For further corroboration of 
the extent of Mr. King’s intervention see Ibid,. pp.302-382; 
Thomson, op, cit,. pp. 211-238; P., Vigeant, "La Nomination de 
M, St, Laurent et 1’Imminence d’une Nouvelle Guerre," Iæ  Devoir 
August 5, 1948; W, Baldtd.n, "Concede St, Laurent Victory", The 
Globe and Mail, August 6, 1948; and B, Hutchison, Mr, Prime 
Minister, (Toronto; Longmans, 1964) p, 292,
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Minister Pearson), afforded Mr. King significant political 
resources to exercise this type of influence.
The influence of the past leader in relation to the 
choice of his successor was not confined to the 1948 
situation, but was also present in the selection of the 
remaining leaders. In 1919, Mr. King utilized the veneration 
accorded to the late leader, Wilfrid Laurier, by intimating 
that his candidacy represented Laurier*s personal preference. 
King* s speech at the convention extolling the virtues of the 
late leader and his support of Laurier*s position during 
the conscription crisis stressed Mr, King* s favourable 
relationship with the past chieftain,^7
In the selection of Mr, Trudeau and Mr, Pearson, 
the same overt emphasis on relationships with the past 
leader was less evident. However, in both of these cases, 
the new leader, as a candidate, did not attempt to criticize 
or to eschew identification with the former leader.
The converse of the above relationship consisted of 
the role of the past leader in promoting the fortunes of a
^^For the actual relationship of Laurier to King* s 
leadership ambitions, see F, A, McGregor, The Fall and Rise of 
Mackenzie King: 1911-1919, (Toronto: Macmillan, 1962) pp. 311- 
320 and H, S. Ferns and B. Ostry, The Age of Mackenzie King: 
The Rise of the Leader, (London; Heinemann, 1955) 284-320, It 
is problematic whether King represented Laurier* s true choice 
as his successor.
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particular leadership candidate. Certainly in 1958 and 1968, 
evidence of the control which Mr, King was reported to have 
exercized in Cabinet prior to the 1948 convention was lacking. 
However, there appeared evidence in both exan^les of 
successful candidates being particularly favoured by the 
activities of the past leader. In 1958, Mr, Pearson was 
not only politically associated with Prime Minister St, 
Laurent; but had been encouraged in his political ambitions 
by Mr, King himself before 1948.^8 Similar to the procedure 
in 1948, when King consulted Ministers Howe and St, Laurent 
prior to his decision to retire,^9 the final decision of 
former Prime Minister St, Laurent to withdraw was occasioned 
by a discussion with past Cabinet colleagues, including 
Pearson and Lionel Chevrier,^® In both instances, the 
meetings reportedly considered the successor to the present 
leader. To Mr, St, Laurent, the assurance of Mr, Pearson*s
S^The party leader encouraged Mr, Pearson to resist 
other offers and to pursue a career in Canadian domestic 
politics, perhaps as leader himself. See The King Record, op, 
cit,. p, 68; J. R, Beal, The Pearson Phenomena (Toronto; 
Longmans, 1964) pp, 85-86; Hutchison, o£, cit,. p, 285; and 
P. Vigeant, "Le Futur Cabinet St, Laurent", Le Devoir. A.ugust 
10, 1948,
59see Hutchison, op. cit.. p, 292* Thomson, og, cit,. 
pp, 211-212; and The Mackenzie King Record, op, cit,, pp,b8-b9.
60See Thomson, cit, . p. 524,
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decision to run in the leadership convention was apparently
a vital causal factor in his resignation. The clear
association of Mr. St, Laurent and the leadership candidate
was further evidenced by his request that Pearson draft the
statement announcing the leader*s resignation,^^
The relationship of Prime Minister Pearson to the
candidacy of Mr, Trudeau suggests a further source of the
influence of the party leader in the leadership selection
process. Thus, by enphasizing certain facets of the party
ideology, (the French-English Canadian partnership and the
principle of leadership alternation), Mr, Pearson tended to
favour a particular leadership candidate. In announcing the
advent of a leadership convention and his retirement, the
Prime Minister pleaded the case of a bilingual governmental
and party leader;
,,,it is one of my secret hopes for Prime 
Ministers of the future,..1 want them to be 
given the privilege of exposure to the two 
great mother languages of the western world 
from cradle to grave. It TTill malce life a 
lot easier,,,for future Prime Ministers, 62
The statement was a significant one in view of the fact that
the majority of established candidates - Sharp, Hellyer, and
81ggg Thomson, op, cit,. p, 524,
82Quoted in Peacock, op, cit,. p, 121.
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Winters - were less than fluently bilingual. Although
External Affairs Minister Martin was bilingual, he was not
privy to the meeting of Mr. Pearson with possible French-
Canàdian, bilingual leaders including Ministers Marchand and
Trudeau. It was at this time that the leader encouraged
the candidacy of a representative of French Canada.^3
The degree to which this indirect promotion of Mr.
Trudeau’s candidacy xoas, in fact, a willful action of the
Prime Minister is, of course, problematical. However, in a
negative sense, the Prime Minister apparently had reason
to prefer the Justice Minister. A former Liberal Cabinet .
member has substantiated this view;
No one of us doubted, hox^ever, that he would 
do everything he legitimately could to stop 
Paul Martin, that he did not want to see 
Hellyer succeed, and that he wasn’t as 
enthusiastic about Mitchell Sharp's candid­
ature as he had once been. I think he him­
self would like to have supported Trudeau, 
but felt that the young man was too much the 
non-conformist ever to make it. 64
To some observers, the emphasis of Mr, Pearson on a French-
Canadian candidate derived in some measure from his preference
G3See Sullivan, op, cit,. p. 274 and Peacock, o d ,  cit,.
Ç, 222 for an account of these meetings, which included both rudeau and Marchand,
84j. LaMarsh. Memoirs of a Bird in a Cilded Cage, 
(Toronto; McClelland and Stewart, 19697 p, 357,
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for Mr, Trudeau, Reportedly, this was the attitude of the
Prime Minister in respect to his discussions xd-th prominent
French-Canadian Liberals,
I was most anxious, likeexeryone else, that 
Marchand should not feel that he x^ as being 
replaced by Trudeau as the French-speaking 
candidate, 65
The actual delineation of the party leader’s 
influence in regard to his successor is a difficult one, 
Hoxflever, some pattern has emerged from 1919 to 1968, This 
pattern has reflected a high degree of coincidence betx^en 
the reported or suspected preference of the party leader and 
his successor selected by the party convention. Moreover, 
successors have hastened to associate themselves xfith the 
preceding leadership and policies. The presence of this 
pattern suggests that the party leaders have possessed some 
capability of performing a significant role in the deter­
mination of the subsequent party leader. More significantly, 
the continuity witnessed betxfeen party leader and successor 
indicates that successful intervention of counter-elites 
attacking the prevailing leadership has been infrequent.
8^Quoted in Sullivan, cit,. p, 273,
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The Leadership Campaign and Organization
In addition to the contribution of the past leader 
in the minimization of inter-elite con^etition, analysis of 
the leadership contests themselves indicates further the 
relative absence of conflict. An observation of Liberal 
conventions reveals that conflict has been infrequent, % hot 
only in a superficial sense due to the first ballot selections 
of 1948 and 1958, but also due to the relative absence of 
institutions or processes conducive to elite conpetition for 
non-elite support.
Indicative of the low priority with which conpetition 
between leadership candidates was regarded were the regulations 
concerning speeches by candidates to convention delegates.
In 1919, leadership candidates were not allowed to present 
public arguments in favour of their candidacies to the 
assembly. Instead, the only public presentations of candidates 
concerned their roles in introducing platform resolutions of 
various convention c o m m i t t e e s , I n  1948 and 1958, the 
limitation on speeches was abandoned in favour of permission
G&King presented the motion on Labour and Industrial 
Conditions, while Fielding introduced the resolution on 
reciprocity. See J, C, Hopkins, ed,, Canadian A.nnual Review of 
Public Affairs. 1919. (Toronto: Canadian Annual Review, 1920) 
pp, 606-607, and The National Liberal Convention, (1919), 
op, cit,. pp, 37, 126-146, and 156-162.
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for limited addresses by candidates to the entire body of 
delegates.
A final procedure for the presentation of candidates 
to the convention delegates was evolved in 1968, As well 
as general speeches by candidates, a series of "workshops" 
established on the basis of general policy areas - "Our 
Economy - Our World", "Our Life", and "Our Country" - were 
available for delegate - candidate discussions. Despite 
the relative informality of these latter occasions, they 
did not provide a forum for intensive candidate debate.
The more controversial exchanges involved the conflict 
between divergent views of constitutional problems possessed 
by Ministers Trudeau and T u r n e r , ^7 A relative lack of 
attention was focused on other areas,
The development of the above procedures indicates at 
least a tendency toward the increasing establishment of 
formal structures conducive to greater contact between 
candidates and delegates. The existence of this trend 
illustrates perhaps that the formal institutions were becoming
87j, Saywell and P Stevens, "Parliament and Politics", in 
The Canadian Annual Review, ed, J, Saywell, p, 24; J, Wearing, 
"The Liberal Choice” , Journal of Canadian Studies. Ill, (May, 
1968), 16,
88see Wearing, o£, cit.. p, 16,
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more hospitable to inter-elite competition. At the same 
time, it indicates, however, that competition of this sort 
has not been an inherent assumption behind the historical 
practice of the leadership selection process. Previously, 
formal convention structures had coincided with attitudes 
deprecating the institution as a forum for extensive 
elite conflict.
In addition to little evidence of convention 
institutions facilitating candidate competition, non­
competitive patterns of activity have existed outside of the 
formal framework of the convention itself. In viewing the 
pre-convention campaigns of candidates for the leadership 
as one of these patterns of activity, the lack of elite 
competition is quite apparent. The activity and attitudes 
of successful leadership candidates has been emblematic of 
the historical insignificance of campaign organization in 
the selection of the party leadership. The archetype of the 
ostensible lack of interest in personal campaigning was 
Mackenzie King’s performance in 1919, Generally considered 
exemplary of King’s position in this matter was his visit 
to the United Kingdom during the months prior to the 
leadership convention. The future Prime Minister recorded 
at the time that his actions were a conscious policy on 
his part:
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I had no organization of any kind and did not 
seek the support of a single man, Mien spoken 
to, I told my friends it was a matter for them 
to consider and so as they might think best.
I literally abstained in every direction from 
exerting any influence whatever. The trip to 
England xms evidence of my desire not to 
intrigue, and my attitude since my return was 
not less visibly so, 69
The reluctance to intercede on one’s oxm behalf in 
the form of a personal leadership campaign remained character­
istic of King’s successor. Despite the contrary efforts of 
his chief opponent, Mr. St. Laurent refused to participate 
in leadership campaigning or policy debate prior to the 
convention. To the External Affairs minister, a serious 
candidacy did not require artificial stimulants of support,
I am not seeking the leadership,,,But I 
believe that any member of the party whom 
the convention selects would feel it an 
honourable duty to accept, I am doing 
nothing at all to influence the choice of 
the party, 70
Officially, St, Laurent considered himself a candidate, 
since he would accept the leadership, but he was not a 
"running" candidate similar to Mr, Gardiner,
Similar to his predecessor, Mr. Pearson’s preparations 
for the leadership convention were not characterized by 
 --
Quoted in Dawson, o£. cit.. p. 298,
^^Quoted in H, Hickey, "Gardiner Announces Candidacy", 
The Globe and Mail. July 12, 1948,
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extensive personal campaigning. Apparently, at lox^ er levels 
of the party, a struggle betxjeen sympathizers of Pearson,
Walter Harris, and Paul Martin had been present for some 
months prior to the resignation of the party leader.
Significantly, however, the elite of the party did not 
encourage this conflict. The minimal level of personal 
campaigning conducted by Mr, Martin, mainly consisting of 
telephone calls and handshakes with arriving delegates, was
72considered exceptional in terms of his opponent’s strategy,
The successful leadership candidate has also tended 
to possess a limited campaign organization within the 
convention itself. As the archetype "machine politicians", 
the unsuccessful candidacies of Gardiner, Graham, Fielding, 
and Martin were more representative than the leaders them­
selves, In 1968, despite a general growth in attention to 
campaign organization, it was Mr, Hellyer’s, rather than 
Mr, Trudeau*s activities which represented the most 
professional convention "machine",73
Candidates’ use of the leadership carpaign and 
organization did increase significantly in 1968,
7^The Globe and Mail. September 4, 1957.
72xhe response of the Pearson camp to Martin’s activity 
was W, Gordon’s encouragement of Keith Davey to "talk it up" 
with party supporters of Pearson, See Beale, op^ , cit,. pp, 140-142,
73see LaMarsh, op, cit,. p, 331,
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As one candidate lamented*
In business, xvhen you xyant a man for an 
important job you turn to the man you xmnt 
not the job seekers.,.I can’t recall other 
leadership conventions in xi/hich the candidates 
have been called upon to debate public issues 
during the course of the campaign, 74
Country-wide campaigns contacting delegates and various 
promotion techniques were undertaken by the major candidates.
The vast expenses incurred illustrate the attendit to mobilize 
party membership in support of particular candidacies,73 
Whether the increase in candidate competition 
witnessed in 1968 can be considered permanent is subject to 
further investigation. However, even accepting this trend 
as irreversible, the development of these structures 
directed conpetition toward personal rather than policy or 
ideological differences among candidates,7  ^ In this respect, 
the 1968 contest resembled all previous leadership selections. 
Only unsuccessful "pariah" candidates, such as J, G, Gardiner, 
emphasized ideological divisions in leadership campaigns in 
previous conventions. Despite contenporary issues of consider­
able inport, the 1968 Liberal candidates also did not engage
7^inters, Robert, quoted in Saywell, o£. cit,. p, 298,
75some candidates were estimated to have spent in excess 
of 400,000 dollars. See K, Z, Paltiel, Political Party Financing 
in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill 1970) pp, 39-40,
78professor Smiley observes that this is more functional 
in terms of retaining party unity and leadership recognizes it 
as such. See Smiley, og_. cit,. pp, 396-397,
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In extensive preconvention policy debate. The early attempts 
by candidates, not including Mr. Trudeau, to debate the Medi­
care question were discontinued in response to the demands 
of the party leader.77
The Leadership Convention and Party Conflict
The formal structure of the national leadership 
convention did allow for a conpetitive leadership selection 
process in the Liberal party. Provisions were made for 
competition between elites and for non-elite participation 
by voting. Despite the formal coirpetitive framework, however, 
characteristics of the convention over much of its history 
did tend to reduce conflict and encourage party consensus 
over leadership - the substantial influence and represent­
ation of Parliamentary elites; the absence of account­
ability procedures or of rules stipulating the frequency of 
leadership conventions; and the choice of a successor. How­
ever, the most significant restraint on the appearance of 
intraparty conflict consisted of the behaviour of the 
political actors themselves. There was relatively little 
disposition among either elites or non-elites to utilize the
7?See Wearing, op, cit,. p, 15,
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convention as a forum for conflict over the party leader­
ship, As a result, informal practices conducive to elite 
competition, such as leadership campaigns or policy debates 
between candidates, did not appear xd.th great frequency. In 
the final analysis, the formal competitive framework 
established by the national party convention did not 
constitute a sufficient condition for the appearance of a 
democratic leadership selection process.
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CHAPTER I I I
THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP CONVENTION AND PAJITY COHESION
Despite the establishment of the national party 
convention as the mechanism for leadership selection in the 
Liberal Party, the structure has not created a high degree 
of conpetition among elites for the support of non-elites.
In this respect, the party leadership convention has not 
functioned primarily as an instrument for accountability or 
control of leaders by the general party membership. In 
this context it becomes necessary to explore the actual 
function of the convention within the Liberal Party and with 
regard to party leadership. If the terminology of R, K, 
Merton can be utilized, a "latent" function of the Party 
leadership convention may be contrasted to its "manifest" 
function of instituting non-elite control over party elites,^
^The treatment here of the leadership convention does 
not represent an application of Merton’s paradigm for socio­
logical analysis, Hoxvever it is useful to utilize his 
distinction between ’’latent” and ’’manifest” ’’functions”. In 
regard to the leadership convention therefore a basic analytic 
difference can be maintained between "consequences" of the 
institution "which are intended and recognized by the parti­
cipants in the system" and "those xvhich are neither intended 
nor recognized." See R. K. Merton, On Theoretical Sociology;
Five Essays Old and New. (New York:"The Free Fress^ 1967), p, 47. 
The selection of leadership is "manifest" in respect to the 
convention; its role in the promotion of party unity primarily 
"latent".
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It is useful to consider the extent to which any 
mechanisms for the selection of party leaders actually 
function as institutionalized control of elites by non­
elites. The mechanisms for the selection of party leaders 
in many democratic systems are thus much less liable to be 
judged prematurely as instruments for non-elite influence 
over elites. For instance, in the United Kingdom and other 
British-type Parliamentary systems, excepting Canada, leader­
ship selection has been the sole prerogative of the 
Parliamentary caucus and, in some cases, has often been 
restricted to an even smaller legislative group. Such a 
procedure remains operative in the British Labour Party 
despite the prevailing democratic ethos characteristic of 
this mass party.%
A traditional argument presented to explain absence 
in certain democratic systems of leadership selection by 
party conventions relies on evidence of dissimilar political 
cultures and governmental types. Thus, the selection of the
^Examples of the conduct of leadership selection in 
British parties confirming these statements are found in R. T. 
McKenzie. British Political Parties. (London; William 
Heinemann, 1954) and G. W. Jones, *'The Prime Minister’s Power", 
in European Political Processes, ed. H. S. Albinski and 
L. K. Pettit, (Boston; Allyn and Bacon, 1968) p, 286,
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party leader by legislative caucus is seemingly consistent, 
in the British case, with a form of government in which 
executive leadership traditionally depends on legislative 
approval rather than on a direct relationship with the 
populace and vdLth a political culture emphasizing deference 
to political elites rather than their control by non-elites.3 
Correspondingly, the convention method is more suitable to 
the "division of powers" concept of government in wrhich the 
political executive is more directly linked to the populace 
than the legislature and accords with political attitudes 
enphasizing non-elite participation in the conduct of 
political affairs.4
Neither political culture nor governmental structure 
account fully for the applicability of the convention method 
to Canada. In addition to the disagreement on the extent to
% o r  an argument of the deferent style characteristic 
of the relationship betwreen British leaders and followers, 
see Richard Rose, Politics in England. (Boston: Little, Brotvn, 
1964) pp. 40-43.
^T. J. Lowi analyzes the nomination of U.S. Presidential 
candidates by party conventions in terms of a relationship to 
the separation of governmental poxters and to the increasing 
democratization and decentralization of the party system. See 
T. J. Loxd., "Party, Policy and Constitution in /merica" in 
The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development. 
ed% W. D. Chambers and W. N, Burnham. iNexy York: Oxford 
University Press, 1967), pp. 245-248.
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which Canadian political culture approaches the populistic, 
American form,3 the suspicion of a basic incompatibility of 
responsible government in the Cabinet system with the 
selection of leaders by party convention exists.^ Nonetheless, 
the national party convention has continued to provide the 
political system with stable forms of leadership conducive to 
maintenance of the political system. Moreover, its function 
as a stable mechanism for Liberal leadership selection has 
coincided with a high degree of both party success and party 
solidarity. Clearly, then, the utility of the party 
convention as a selection mechanism in the Canadian party 
situation is not present solely for reasons of either political 
culture or of governmental structure.
A more acceptable explanation for the suitability of 
the national party convention derives from the nature of the 
social and political environment to which a party system must 
adapt. Studying the party convention’s role in the United 
States political system, a distinguished American scholar has 
offered the observation:
5see S. M. Lipset, "Canada and the United States: A 
Comparative ViexV, The Canadian Review of Sociology and 
Anthropology. 1 (1964), 175-179.
6See D. V. Smiley, "The National Party Leadership 
Convention in Canada: A Preliminary Analysis", Canadian Joumal 
of Political Science. (March, 1968), 382.
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The national convention represents the 
solution by American parties of the problem 
of uniting scattered points of political 
leadership in support of candidates for 
the Presidency and Vice Presidency, Thus it 
is the basic element of the national party 
apparatus,,.In a fairly real sense, the 
national convention is the national party. 
l-Jhen means develop for uniting people in 
support of a nominee, the essence of party 
comes into being...The national convention 
thus is at the heart of the national party 
system. 7
Professor Key’s analysis of the national convention recognizes 
the decentralized, "constituent" nature of American parties 
due to their performance as aggregators, within a federal 
political system, of multitudinous demands emanating from a 
diversified social structure.
In many respects the American party and societal 
situation parallels the position of the Liberal Party in 
Canada. Thus, the existence of the national party convention 
as the mechanism of leadership selection in the Liberal Party 
can be viewed as consistent with a particular party response 
to Canadian political and social conditions.
Studies have indicated that the development of 
political parties and of their internal characteristics has 
often coincided with changing characteristics of the social
^Key, V. 0., Politics. Parties and Pressure Groups, 
(new York: T. Y. Crowell, 1964) pp. 396 and 431.
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structure or of other areas in the political system. The 
introduction of mass suffrage has thus generally influenced 
the increasing bureaucratization and internal democratization
O
of political parties. For reasons of relative social 
9homogeneity or due to the party’s approach to electoral 
success,the parliamentary caucus remained, despite mass 
suffrage, the characteristic European form of leadership 
selection. However, in the North American situation, national 
political parties faced the further prospect of reconciling 
a large degree of regional, ethnic and class diversity in 
order to achieve governmental power. Of particular significance 
to the parties’ efforts was the influence .of regionalism, which
8see Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation" in From Max 
Weber, ed. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1946), pp. 102-103. See also M. Duverger, 
Political Parties (London: Methuen, 1959), pp. 223-228.
^According to some analysts, this was the dominant 
factor shaping political development in the United Kingdom.
See J. Blondel, Voters/ Parties/ and Leaders: The Social Fabric 
of British Politics (London: Penguin, 1963)7 PP* 21-26.
lOln many European parties, explicit identification 
with certain social groupings or vTith particular ideologies 
is more vital than the pursuit of governmental power through 
pragmatic electoral means. A modem example is the Italian 
Christian Democrats. For the affect of this characteristic on 
its leadership recruitment patterns, see Giovanni Sartori, 
"European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism" 
in Political Parties and Political Development. ed. J. 
LaPalombara and M. Weiner. (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1966), pp. 143-144.
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was reinforced by the operation of a federal systen^^ and by
electoral systems which exaggerated regional representation
12in legislatures.
The influence of these conditions of social diversity 
became particularly acute to the Liberal Party in the period 
between 1887 - the selection of Sir Wilfrid Laurier by the 
party caucus to succeed Edward Blake - and 1919, when the 
first selection of a national leader was accomplished by 
party convention. The Canadian situation was endemically 
more conplex than the American, due to the existence of the 
province of Quebec, which overlapped ethnic loyalties with 
the regional identifications already encouraged by the federal
^Certainly the existence of a federal political 
system facilitates the mobilization of regional demands and 
their presentation to the central authority. Moreover, it has 
been argued that the federal nature of a system may encourage 
the persistence of opposition to the centralization of the 
political systan after the initial social or political reasons 
for opposition have declined. See T. J. Loxfi, o£. cit.. pp. 253- 
254.
^^A concise argument of this hypothesis in reference 
to the Canadian political system is found in A. C. Caims,
"The Electoral and Party Systems in Canada, 1929 - 1965". 
Canadian J oumal of Political Science. I (March, 1968) passim. 
See also Duverger, o^. cit.. pp7 216-228.
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and electoral structures of the country.13 However, 
political and social developments, particularly the expansion 
of immigration, economic growth, and the addition of new 
provinces, had exacerbated the social diversity upon which 
the Canadian political system was based in 1919.
The most significant of these elements of diversity 
in terms of their effect on political movements was the 
development of prairie agriculture and the expansion of 
industry. The expansion of these interests and their 
mobilization due to the conditions of the World War I era^^ 
increased substantially the complexity of the Canadian 
political system of 1919 in comparison to the nineteenth
The relationship of Quebec to the regional ethnic 
and religious cleavages of the Canadian political system is a 
significant one. Its creation of an "overlapping" pattern of 
cleavages has considerable effect on the nature of the 
Canadian party system. See R. R. Alford, Party and Society;
The Anglo-American Democracies (Chicago; Rand-McNally, 1963)
p. 260.
l^Two simultaneous movements dominated the Canadian 
economic system in the early years of the twentieth century 
prior to the 1920’s. The first witnessed the ejqiansion of the 
western wheat economy which brought the prairie provinces into 
the mainstream of Canadian political and economic activity. The 
birth of the "nexv industrialism" and the growth of Canadian 
manufacturing to an output equivalent to agriculture constituted 
the second of these trends. See W. T. Easterbrook and H. G. J, 
Aitken, Canadian Economic History (Toronto; Macmillan, 1965), 
pp. 476-488; 515-522. The emergence of labour and agriculture as 
significant political interests was the result of these economic 
forces. See W. L. Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada. 
(Toronto; University of Toronto Press, 195()), pp. 3^95, and Gad 
Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics. (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1968), pp. 3ÏÏ-61.
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century. This was reflected in the election data of the 
period. Although Parliamentary seats increased by just 20 to 
235, the electorate expanded fourfold betxveen the elections 
of 1887 and 1921 from less than a million to more than three 
million voters. The problems thus posed to the two major 
parties at the national level were illustrated in the 1921 
election results. While the category "Other" received a 
mere 1.6 percent of the vote in 1887, almost 6 percent of the 
1921 electorate were recorded under this category. Moreover, 
this statistic does not include the 9.0 percent of 1921 
voters who registered some disapproval of the prevailing 
party system by voting for the P r o g r e s s i v e s . 13
The growth of socio-economic diversity coirplicated the 
task of building a viable "national" party. If this task is 
construed as a process of distributing party output among the 
claims or demands emanating from these interests, processes 
such as the choice of party leader must appear to take 
cognizance of these danands. Leadership selection in the 
Liberal party since 1919 has been conducted in the context of 
an overriding concern with building a national party from the
15See Howard Scarrow, Canada Votes; A Handbook of 
Federal and Provincial Election Data %l4ew Orleans; Hauser Press, 
1962),“pp. 21, 34-35.
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prevailing diversity of social groups* The utility of the 
mechanism of selection can therefore be measured by its 
ability to contribute to the reconciliation of the demands 
of these interests - in effect, to socialize potential 
inner-party conflict over leadership.
A precondition of socialization of potential conflict 
is participation.IG Allowance of a sufficient degree of part­
icipation through representation of demands is thus a vital 
measure of the utility of a given selection mechanism. In the 
position of the Liberal party after World War I, due to the 
proliferation of political and societal cleavages and the nuances 
of the electoral system, the legislative caucus did not appear 
to provide adequately for this representation. The provision 
of an institution more representative than the Parliamentary 
p a r t y o f  these social interests was therefore a necessity. 
Although there seems little evidence of a direct causal link be­
tween this situation and the provision of a national leadership
16See David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life. 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), pp. 236-238.
17q £ the total of 83 seats held by the Liberals only 20 
were outside of Quebec. Moreover a mere two seats represented 
the Liberal Party west of Ontario. This lack of representation 
occurred despite the fact the Liberals never gained less than 
20% of the total popular vote and only less than 25% in one 
province, Manitoba. See H. G. Tliorbum, ed., Party Politics 
in Canada, 2nd ed. (Scarborough; Prentice-Hall, 1967% 
pp. 214-225.
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convention in 1919, the convention appears to have been
considered the most efficacious arrangement possible under
the circumstances. R, M, Dawson does remark that:
...the convention would determine in large 
measure how permanent was to be the dis­
ruption of the Liberals, to what degree the 
party could forget the animosities of the 
conscription election and reach out and 
meet some of the more recent movements 
which were breaking do%vn traditional 
loyalties and threatening the stability 
of the old federal parties. 18
The convention alone seemed to provide adequate representation
to those forces - including. Liberal members of Parliament who
supported Laurier* s struggle against conscription, independent
Liberal members such as Fielding who supported the Unionist
cause but who after the war ivished to return to the Liberal
fold. Liberals involved in provincial politics who nonetheless
had harboured Unionist sympathies nationally, various extra-
parliamentary "Laurier" Liberals, and all those federal M.P.*s
who "desire to cooperate with the Liberal P a r t y " - necessary
to the regrouping of a national party.
The 1919 situation of the Liberal Party is of course
l^Dawson, R. M., William Lyon Mackenzie King: A Political 
Biography, 1874-1923 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1958), p. 298.
19por a complete account of the alignment of political 
forces at the 1919 convention, see Dawson, o^. cit.. pp.
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merely an exceptional example of the unique contribution of
the convention to the support of a stable selection process.
However, in all its applications, the representational
formulas of Liberal leadership conventions were sufficient
to create a greater degree of participation than could the
Parliamentary caucus. In an explicit form, the 1919 example
illustrates that the essence of the national party convention* s
role consisted in its ability to permit the overt participation
in the leadership selection process of a wide spectrum of
party activists, whose exclusion would have been detrimental
20to party ambitions.
Although a precondition, mere participation is certainly 
not a sufficient cause of the resolution of conflict within an 
institution. First of all, conflict must be confined within 
reasonable boundaries by some form of preliminary consensus, 
at least in order to legitimize the means rather than the 
ends of the activity involved. Moreover, within these 
boundaries, an institution, through its structure and by the 
behaviour of its participants, must be conducive to the 
maintenance of this preliminary consensus.
2®The chief of these would in this case be electoral 
success and party unity.
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In the case of the Canadian Liberal Party, a factor 
contributing to the discouragement of convention conflict 
and therefore encouraging a stable leadership selection 
process has been the relatively high incidence at convention 
periods of party electoral success and of optimistic out­
looks toward party victory. By encouraging the exhibition of 
a high degree of internal party consensus, this has facilitated 
the acceptance of the successful leadership candidate by its 
participants. Significantly, at a low ebb of party fortunes 
(1919), the new leader’s succession was greeted with the 
most scepticism, due in particular to the question of his 
acceptability to western v o t e r s . I n  contrast, during 
periods of actual electoral success (1948, 1968) or of 
expectant victory (1958) the party leader’s efficacy as a 
vote-getter was relatively unimpugned.
The prevalence of electoral success or of optimistic 
outlooks toward it at convention periods and, therefore, the 
existence of inducements to party consensus relate directly 
to the control over the occurrence of leadership conventions 
vested in the person of the party leader. Certainly such an 
hypothesis cannot be applied in 1919, when the death of the
2^ne of the sceptics was the influential editor of the 
Free Press. J. W. Dafoe. See Ramsey Cook, The Politics of John 
W. Dafoe and the Free Press (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1963), p. 106.
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past leader was involved. However, in other situations, 
the occurrence of a leadership convention was governed by 
the discretion of the party leader instead of by specific 
constitutional directives relating to leadership succession. 
This was at least conducive to a greater control of the 
electoral situation of the party at the time of the convention, 
In contrast to formal rules regarding convention occurrence, 
such as in the United States, which do not allow this control, 
the flexibility of the Liberal situation has allowed elites 
the opportunity to choose occasions conducive to an untroubled 
transfer of leadership. Although the exact extent to which 
this consideration has entered into the calculations of 
leaders cannot be ascertained, it is reasonable to expect 
that leaders were not unaware of the degree and nature of 
party consensus at the time of their decisions.
A high incidence of electoral success and the control 
over the initiation of the leadership convention possessed 
by the party leader has encouraged the probability of 
consensus within the institution. In the final analysis, 
however, consensus within the national Liberal convention 
was a function of a more central political process. This 
process was based on the congruence of the interests of the
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22party elite and non-elite.
For the leadership convention to remain a contribution 
to a stable selection process and to party unity, the 
capability of reconciling the interests of party elites xd.th 
the bulk of non-elite participants was essential. In practice, 
the leadership convention of the Liberal party has exhibited 
this capability, since the desire of occupants of various 
elite roles to control the selection of leader has been 
consistent with the expectations of party non-elites. The 
basis for this reconciliation has ultimately rested in the 
acceptance by non-elites, except for isolated, insignificant 
instances,of the necessity of selecting party leaders from
^Difference of interest derive from the oligarchical 
nature of party organization. See Robert Michels, Political 
Parties; A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies 
of Modem Democracy (New York; Hearst’s International Library, 
1915), p. 32. A similar argument is developed in Duverger, 
op. cit.. pp. 133-182. A further differentiation of party 
roles is enforced by the responsibility of the party as govern­
ment. Thus, Parliamentary elites retain their autonomy in 
respect to the formation of public policy. See Duverger, 
op. cit.. pp. 182-202; and also E. Eager, "The Paradox of 
Power in the Saskatchewan C.C.F., 1944-1961", in The Political 
Process in Canada, ed. J. H. Aitchison. (Toronto; University of 
Toronto Press, 1963). For a discussion in relation to the 
Canadian Liberal Party, see Chapter II, above.
2%Ir. L. Henderson is the sole exception. However, 
his vote totals in 1958 and 1968 (1 and 0) testify to his 
practical and analytical insignificance.
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the party elite. The individual delegates who constituted 
the convention non-elite were basically concerned with the 
utilization of the ballot to choose between elites rather 
than demanding non-elite control of the party leadership.
In effect, the former activity represented the maximum degree 
of participation expected by occupants of non-elite roles.
Due to the structure and practice of the convention, however, 
this degree of participation could be afforded non-elites 
without necessarily reducing the potential influence of party 
elites.
The basis for the lack of true control in the leader­
ship convention possessed by non-elites has derived from the 
factors elaborated earlier diminishing the significance of 
the leadership ballot - the decreased influence of the 
independent delegate due to lack of information and to the 
effectiveness of Parliamentary elites as sources of information 
and opinion; and the discouraging of viable alternative elites 
by the avoidance of policy debates and information campaigns 
by convention candidates. As a result, control was largely 
the prerogative of elite roles - the former leader, the 
Cabinet and Parliamentary membership. In this manner, elites 
within the party were generally allowed to possess influence
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in relation to leadership selection corranensurate with their 
24party status.
The Regulation of Internal Party Conflict
The above analysis has suggested that a function of 
the party leadership convention has been the promotion of 
party unity and the furtherance of the party’s attenpt to 
encompass a wide diversity of social interests. As a 
corollary, it has also maintained that the leadership 
convention did not exist merely to provide for a democratic 
choice of leaders within the traditional competitive model 
of leadership selection.
In contrasting these functions of the institution, 
the relationship of the leadership convention to internal 
party conflict is revealed. The party convention, despite 
providing ostensibly for competition among leadership 
candidates, has also controlled rather than encouraged party 
conflict. Only in respect to the performance of the former
^^Explicit examples of informal practices of leadership 
selection recognizing the inequality of individuals’ influence 
occurred frequently. The informal meetings alluded to earlier 
were somewhat exemplary in this respect. In 1948, Mr. King’s 
consultation with C. D. Howe over the admissibility of Mr. St. 
Laurent as party leader amounted to a virtual veto possessed 
informally by a powerful party figure. See D. C. Thomson,
Louis St. Laurent; Canadian (Toronto: Macmillan, 1967), p. 211.
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service has the leadership convention invariably been
utilized, since in reality elite competition has been
minimized. The leadership convention in the Liberal Party
has thus resembled a "functional mechanism" as described by
25the sociologist, Karl Mannheim. In this respect the 
convention is usefully regarded as an institution, possessing 
a formula - in this case the balloting of delegates - which 
legitimizes collective decisions in the absence of complete 
agreement. , According to this conception, the essence of 
the leadership convention has consisted in its ability to 
regulate conflict over leadership in the interests of party 
consensus.
25See Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1936), p. 23.
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CHAPTER IV
THE LEADERSHIP CANDIDATES
Despite provision for conflict, the formal and 
informal structure of the leadership convention has not been 
extensively utilized as a forum for conflict between party 
elites or as an instrument of non-elite control of the party 
leadership. This feature of the leadership convention was 
encouraged by the existence of rules of the game and by a 
process of preselection which discouraged the appearance of 
competitive candidates and behaviour. The characteristics and 
behaviour of leadership candidates indicate this form of 
preselection and rules of the game prevailing In the selection 
of Liberal leaders.
The Leadership Candidates: Characteristics
A significant feature of Liberal leadership candidates 
has been their association with careers at the federal level 
of government. Of the 17 major candidates for the party 
leadership from 1919 to 1968,1 only Mr. Kierans lacked
lAll candidates were considered serious or major ivith 
the exception of L. Henderson in 1958 and 1968. Only candidates 
who actually were nominated at the convention and remained 
until the casting of the first ballot with one exception - 
Mitchell Sharp.
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experience in federal politics. The emphasis on careers at
the federal level of government was also evident in the
degree of initiation of future candidates directly into
politics at the federal level, A mere four candidates, in
addition to Mr. Kierans, had held provincial political
office prior to their introduction into federal politics.
Two of these candidates - J. G. Gardiner and W. S. Fielding -
were leaders of provincial governments. In all of these
cases, however, with the one exception of Mr. Kierans, the
federal careers of these individuals were quite extensive
prior to their attempt to gain the leadership.
The characteristics of candidates indicate the
inportance of possessing some experience in government
positions at this level, not only in terms of House of
Commons membership, but with respect to Cabinet posts as
well. With the duly noted exception, all leadership candidates
previously possessed Parliamentary and Cabinet membership
at Ottawa. Moreover, in 1919, Mr. King’s temporary lack of
a Commons seat was the only case of a candidate’s failure to
occupy a legislative position at the time of the selection of
2a party leader.
^The Minister of Finance, Walter E. Harris, was 
considered a prime contender for the party leadersnip - The 
Globe and Mail (Toronto) September 4, 1957 - until his defeat 
in the general election of 1957.
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TABLE 2: PERCENTAGES OF CANDIDATES WITH PEuVINCIAL OR
FEDERAL PANTY EXPERIENCE____________________________________
%
Provincial Office Holders 29,4
Federal Office Holders 94,1
N = 17
The general characteristics of leadership candidates 
in the Liberal party differ in some degree from those of 
their counterparts in other Canadian parties. In this respect, 
the propensity toward federal party careers of limited 
duration was a particularly distinctive trait of Liberal 
candidates. Leaders and candidates of the Conservative 
and New Democratic parties have been to a much greater extent 
products of extensive provincial party service and of 
prolonged careers as professional politicians.3
The characteristics differentiating Liberal leader­
ship candidates from those in other Canadian parties are
3
The list of candidates x<rith extensive previous careers 
in provincialpolitics seeking the leadership of the Conservatives 
is extensive - Bracken, Diefenbaker, Drew, Roblin, Stanfield.
See Ruth M. Bell, "Conservative Party National Conventions, 
1927-1956" (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Carleton University, 1965) 
and D.-Peacock, Journey to Power (Toronto; Macmillan, 1968), 
pp. 13-109. Furthermore, former Conservative leaders Bracken,
Drew, Diefenbaker and the present leader, Mr. Stanfield had at 
least some experience in provincial politcs and also came from 
areas other than the central provinces. See J. K. Johnson, ed.,
The Canadian Directory of Parliament 1867-1967. (Ottawa; Queen's 
Printer, 1968), pp.459, 554-555 and 578. See also Peacock, 
on, cit.. pp. 13-109.
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even more pronounced in the case of the party leaders. 
Successful candidates for the leadership exhibited political 
backgrounds distinguishing them, not only from the leaders 
of other parties, but also from unsuccessful candidates 
within the Liberal party. Thus, successful and unsuccessful 
Liberal candidates differed considerably in relation to 
their background in provincial or federal politics, the 
length of political and Parliamentary service, and the 
quality and extent of executive experience.^
TABLE 3: PROVINCIAL, PARLIAMENTARY AND CABINET CAREERS OF
LEADERSHIP CANDIDATES
Leaders, 
N=4
Non-Leaders,
N=13
All Candidates 
N=17
Average Years in 
Elected Provincial 
Office
--- 4.0 3.1
Average Years in 
Federal Parliament 5.3 13.4 11.5
Average Years in 
Federal Cabinet 4.8 6.9 6.4
The resolution of the process of leadership selection 
in the Liberal party has been favourable to candidates who not 
only identified with the federal political level, but also those
^See Tables 2 to 5.
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xfho possessed a limited tenure of Parliamentary and 
Cabinet positions prior to their pursuit of the party 
leadership. The longest Parliamentary and Cabinet apprentice­
ship of a Liberal leader was Mr. Pearson's, of 10 and 9 years 
respectively. The legislative experience of both Mr. Trudeau
and Mr. King extended less than 5 years, of which both spent 
a considerable portion as Cabinet ministers. Moreover, 
infrequently did any eventual leader function as a private 
M.P.. Of the four Liberal leaders, only Mr. Trudeau - from 
1965 to 1967 - served as a government back-bencher. All the 
remaining leaders were co-opted directly into Cabinet 
positions.3
^This C O - option was characteristic of Cabinet member­
ship as a whole. A study of Cabinets from 1940 to 1960 has 
shown 40% of ministers were appointed during their first 
political (Parliamentary) term. See J. Porter, The Vertical 
Mosaic. (Toronto; University of Toronto Press, 1965), p. 400.
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TABLE 4: CANDIDATES ACCORDING TO LENGTH OF FEDERAL POLITICAL
CAREERS PRIOR TO CANDIDACY
1-10 10-20 20+
Leaders; King
St. Laurent
Pearson — ■Illi—IM ■M, ■ ,
Trudeau
Non-Leaders Greene Fielding Martin
Sharp Graham Poxvter
Turner Mackenzie
Gardiner
Winters
Hellyer
MacEachen
Candidate Behaviour: The Regional Representative and the 
Professional Politician
The predominance of federal careers and the limited 
experience in formal political offices among eventual party 
leaders was indicative of a sharp contrast bett^een 
victorious leaders and defeated leadership candidates in the 
Liberal party. The failure of particular types of leadership 
candidacies further exemplified the correspondence of degree 
of success with certain candidate characteristics. Thus, the 
regional representative, who had gathered political experience 
at the provincial level or xdio had developed a regional 
constituency as a federal politician, and the professional.
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filong-time politician, who had extensive political experience 
as a legislative and Cabinet member prior to his leadership 
candidacy, consistently failed to gain the leadership of the 
Liberal party. Three of these candidates - Fielding, D. D. 
Mackenzie, and Allan MacEachen - represented the Maritimes; 
the final regional candidate in this category, J. C. Cardiner, 
was a westerner. Of these candidates, the political back­
ground of Mr. Gardiner in particular and his approach to the 
question of party leadership clearly illustrated both the 
regional nature of his candidacy and the difficulties of 
this form of candidacy in respect to the selection of 
Liberal leaders.
Candidate Province
-i- *■- .. ..._... .
Position
Fielding Nova Scotia Cabinet Minister
Graham Ontario Cabinet Minister & Leader
Mackenzie Nova Scotia Member of Legislative 
Assembly
Gardiner Saskatchewan Premier & Leader
Kierans Quebec Cabinet Minister
In Porter* s terminology, the professional politician 
represents "a professionalizing of political roles where the 
individual devotes his life to politics and in the process 
develops a * love* for political institutions." See Porter, 
op. cit.. pp. 405-406.
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There can be little doubt of the explicit identification 
of Gardiner* s political career with the interests of the western 
prairie provinces end in particular with western agriculture, , 
His position as Premier of Saskatchewan from 1926 to 1929 and 
his occupancy of the Agriculture portfolio in the Liberal 
Cabinets of the King and St. Laurent governments were consistent 
with a close relationship to these groups.
The character of Mr. Gardiner as a regional represent­
ative was apparently contributory to his difficulties as a 
leadership candidate. The basis of this difficulty rested 
with his excessive attachment to a particular faction of the 
Liberal party and to a particular group in the Canadian 
social system. An accurate appraisal of the image which 
resulted from this form of political behaviour has been 
offered by a biographer;
the common currency of contemporary comment has 
been that he is too much a politician and too 
much the Westerner...Gardiner seems to have 
been regarded by the rest of Canadians, and in 
particular by those policy-molding parliamentary 
figures, as exclusively and dominantly the 
champion and favorite native son of the Prairie 
provinces. 7
Benson, N. A., None of it Came Easy: The Story of James 
Garfield Gardiner (Toronto: Bums and MacEachem, 1955), pp. 9 
and 217. For further examples, see M. King The Mackenzie King 
Record: IV. 1947-1948. ed. J. W. Pickersgill and D. F. Forster. 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), pp. 125-126 
and 332.
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In Parliament and Cabinet, the Minister’s extreme concern 
xiTith the promotion of western interests thus often placed 
him in opposition to contrary demands by other political
Q
figures and political groups.
As well as adhering to his representative function 
within the context of Cabinet and Parliamentary activity,
Mr, Gardiner approached the contest for the party leadership 
with a similar explicit identification to this particular 
segment of the Liberal party. Prior to the 1848 convention, 
the Minister of Agriculture rms involved in a wide variety 
of controversial issues relating to x-zestem interests. In 
March and April of 1948, Cabinet controversy over railway 
freight rates and the nature of nexir wheat marketing legis­
lation resulted in Gardiner’s association vTith the demands of 
western farm interests.9 In contrast, his opponent was 
concerned xd.th issues relating to external affairs, which x?ere
^The Minister was often said to have "taken care of" 
the producers, xfhile others were disadvantaged. See The 
Mackenzie King Record, op. cit., p. 332. In addition the 
Minister refused to cooperate xvith the legislative committee, 
chaired by Paul Martin, xc-hich xvas investigating excessive 
prices. See The Globe and Mail (Toronto), May 11, 1948.
^Ibid.. Plarch 31, 1948; March 20, 1948; and May 8, 1948 .
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much less likely to provoke internal party c o n f l i c t . T h e  
great difference in the issues confronted by the txTO leader­
ship candidates xvas exemplified in policy speeches given by 
both on May 8, 1948. Unlike Mr. St. Laurent’s speech which 
basically concerned the government’s policy against Communism,
Mr. Gardiner emphasized his stand in support of the unpopular
11ban on Margarine.
The Agriculture Minister’s campaign for the leadership
culminated in his promulgation of a ten point platform. The
platform was really an embodiment of western demands on the
federal government and on the central, industrial regions.
The familiar requests for the expansion of immigration,
export and transportation policies was coupled with the call
for the decentralization of industry and the development of
12western resources. AxS wrell as representing an unprecedented 
action by a candidate for the Liberal leadership, the content 
of the program once again clearly indicated Mr. Gardiner* s 
character as a regional representative.
lOThe external affairs policy of the St. Laurent era 
was based on a premise of a hostility to international 
communism. As a result, there was little basis for partisan 
debate.
l^The Globe and Mail (Toronto), May 9, 1948. 
l^The Globe and Mail (Toronto), July 23, 1948.
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The regional basis of Gardiner’s candidacy was
reflected in wrhat support he did achieve. The regional
criteria upon which his candidacy was evaluated was
illustrated by the leader of the Saskatchewan Liberals,
Walter Tucker, one of the few prominent public supporters of
Gardiner. As his reason for voting he declared;
Agriculture is going to be faced xd.th diffi­
culties in the future comparable to those of 
the 30’s. A man who has x^orked for Agriculture 
and xvho has worked to get markets for the 
farmer all his life is going to be more helpful 
as leader of the government in the times that 
may come. I am not voting against anyone. I 
have the greatest admiration for Mr. St. Laurent 
and his ability as a statesman. I am voting 
for Mr. Gardiner. 13
Similarly, the Alberta leader, J, J. Bowlen, indicated his
belief in the legitimacy of a regional candidate.
I am not one of those x-jho puts the West up 
against the East, but this party must 
recognize the needs of both West and East.
The voice of the West is not being heard 
in Ottaxm. 14
Along xd.th the backing from these western leaders, the Gardiner 
campaign was reinforced by elements of the Ontario Liberals,
13
Quoted in "Highlights at Liberal Convention Previexv", 
in The Globe and Mail (Toronto), August 5, 1948.
14ibid.. p.5.
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1 C
who represented the rural x^ng of the Ontario party.
Despite the support he obtained from his oxm
constituency, Mr. Gardiner* s status as a regional candidate
clearly diminished his prospects of attaining the party
leadership. The feuds prompted in the Liberal Cabinet by
the championing of causes unacceptable to his colleagues
resulted quite early in a "beat Gardiner" alliance among
prominent Liberals at the federal l e v e l . S u c h  a situation
xms anticipated by the Liberal leader himself in assessing
the overall strength of Gardiner*s candidacy;
I imagine Gardiner has these txvo provinces 
(Saskatchewan and Alberta) in hand. The fact 
that the West is strongly Gardiner xd.ll _ 
operate against him in the other p r o v i n c e s .
In addition, the promulgation of Gardiner* s platform offered
an opportunity for wider opposition to crystallize. Thus, a
prominent Quebec newspaper attacked Gardiner* s platform as a
l^This faction x^ as lead by Colin Campbell. Gardiner 
and the rural xdng of the Ontario party had been associated with the 
forces of the Liberal premier of the province, Mitchell Hepbum 
- an intense rival of Prime Minister King. See The Mackenzie 
King Record.
^^Ibid.. pp. 352-353; The Globe and Mail (Toronto),
May 11, 1948. One reported statement from a member of the 
Manitoba delegation maintained; "Garson xd.ll get pretty close 
to unanimous support from the Manitoba delegation. We’re 
frankly out to beat Gardiner," The Winnipeg Free Press,
July 5, 1948.
l^The Mackenzie King Record, op. cit.. p. 358.
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clear appeal to x^estern economic sentiment, which x;as 
incompatible xdth the unifying function leadership should 
perform.
Ce programme attente en effet a l’unité 
nationale, a la souveraineté canadienne 
et a l’influence française. 18
By reinforcing his image as a regional candidate, the 
presentation of the platform, rather than mobilizing support, 
actually facilitated the emergence of further opposition.
The emergence of this opposition contributed to Mr, Gardiner’s 
rather severe defeat at the leadership convention of 1948,
The inability of Mr. Gardiner to present a serious 
threat to the ascendancy of Mr. St. Laurent corresponded to 
the general failure of the regional candidate as a leader­
ship aspirant in the Liberal party. Two sources of this 
general failure can be considered - the effect of differing 
delegate strengths among regions and the prevalence of certain 
rules of the game diminishing the legitimacy of parochial 
appeals within the Liberal party. On the first issue, the 
disadvantages accruing to Mr. Gardiner from the inferiority 
of his western and agricultural constituency in terms of 
convention votes are quite evident. Certainly a vast
TSpierre Vigeant, "Un ennemi a combattre; M. J. G. 
Gardiner'’, Le Devoir. July 28, 1948.
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majority of delegates came from French Canada, industrial 
areas, or the coastal provinces, whose interests xfcre 
opposed or only marginally sympathetic to western or farmer 
demands.
There is little evidence nonetheless that the 
respective delegate strengths of regions at conventions 
constitutes a sufficient condition for the bias against 
regional representatives as leadership candidates. On this 
note, it is important to recognize that distortions in 
delegate representation due to great electoral success in 
particular regions have not been a primary factor in 
Canadian conventions, as has been the case in the United 
S t a t e s , S i n c e  constituency delegates remained constant 
regardless of the success of the party in the constituency 
and since both defeated and victorious federal candidates 
were automatically delegates, there was no regional dis­
tortion in this respect. Admittedly, a region constituting 
a substantial proportion of the Parliamentary party, such 
as has been the case of the Quebec Liberals, would possess a 
greater degree of influence than a region represented by
See V. 0, Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups. 
(Nex^  York: T, Y. Crox^ rell, 1945), pp. 402-407. Similarly, 
representation at N.D.P. conventions does create biases in 
favour of particular regions.
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defeated candidates. Hox^ever, in practice, this has been
partially countered by the provisions for representation of
provincial Parlianentary elites. In the Liberal conventions
from 1948 to 1968, for instance, the provincial Liberal
parties in both Quebec end Ontario were in minority positions
on
in the provincial legislatures^^ - reducing the representation 
of these regions. The feet therefore, that the formulas for 
delegate representation did not reinforce regions, such as 
Quebec, which possessed a larger share of the federal 
Parliamentary party and that regional representation in 
the federal legislative party did not often coincide with the 
party’s control of the provincial legislature, diminished any 
tendency toward a numerical preponderance of delegates from 
a single region.
As no inordinate bias is forced on delegate represent­
ation as a result of electoral success, it is difficult to 
justify the difference in significance of regional candidates 
between the Liberal and the Conservative parties on the basis 
of distortions of regional delegate strength. Despite the 
lack of distortion, it is true that the central provinces of
2®There is however strength to the argument that the 
western provinces, especially Alberta end British Columbia 
which have been dominated by third party regimes, have been 
thereby disadvantaged in terms of delegate strength.
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Ontario and Quebec, 1£ united, retained a virtual veto over 
potential coalitions based on the peripheral regions. Hox^ - 
ever, there has been no indication that such monolithic unity 
has been characteristic of the delegates from central Canada.
In varying degrees, significant divisions of opinion on the 
choice of leader x^ ere present in the Ontario Liberal party at 
all conventions and, to a lesser extent, in the Quebec party. 
Certainly at no time x^ as there virtual unanimity among 
delegates from central Canada as a xvhole.
The argument that a bias has existed against regional 
candidates independent of the delegate strength apportioned 
to regions is also reflected in the avoidance by the successful 
candidates themselves, whose background and support was based 
in central Canada, of explicit appeals to or identification 
xvith this region. In fact. Liberal leaders received a large 
amount of support of necessity from the central provinces, 
especially Quebec. Hox^ever, the leaders did not overtly 
cultivate the interests represented by these areas, despite 
the decisive number of delegates involved. An attempt xms 
made to appeal to all regions, at least in the form of a call 
for national unity. Tlie interest of the major 1968 candidates.
Z^The Gardiner-St. Laurent split in the Ontario party in 
1948 is a fine example of such a difference of opinion in the 
Ontario Liberals.
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including Trudeau, Sharp end Martin, to cultivate intensively 
at great e3q>ense delegates outside of the central provinces 
exemplified this concern for all regions of the country. 
Although surreptitiously the successful leadership candidates 
perhaps continued to be representatives of central Canadian 
interests, the important fact remains that ostensibly they 
adhered to a non-regional orientation. Thus, these candidates 
overtly appealed to unity instead of to diversity and thereby 
avoided the stigma of illegitimacy seemingly characteristic 
of the more obvious regional candidate.
The conduct and result of Mr. Gardiner*s campaign 
for the party leadership and the low frequency of candidates 
either :fith significant careers in other than federal politics 
or directly co-opted from provincial office, does not result 
directly from differences in delegate representation. Rather, 
their lack of success illustrates the existence of rules of 
the game governing leadership selection in the Liberal party 
which discount the legitimacy of explicit appeals to regional 
loyalty and to party diversity. The illegitimacy accorded to
22see P. C. Newman, The Distemper of Our Times. 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, l9bu), pp. '439,~45r-456. 
This situation is not readily attributable to a greater 
division in the central provinces, since Mr. Trudeau, like 
previous leaders, also had an equally strong foundation of 
Quebec support and significant Ontario backing.
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appeals to party diversity by the rules of the game 
complemented a party ideology valuing solidarity and consensus, 
but was inconsistent m t h  the applicability of conflict 
between elites as a primary criterion of leadership selection. 
The failure of the regional representative as a leadership 
candidate was thus demonstrative of the priority of consensus 
over conflict in respect to leadership selection in the 
Liberal party.
Similar to the regional candidate, the professional 
politician* s difficulties can be viewed as stemming from the 
identification with particular interests which a prolonged 
political career encouraged. An identification td.th any 
particular social interest, regional or otherxd.se, promoted 
the image of a leadership candidate as a representative of a 
parochial group rather than as a symbol of unity. Thus, in 
1919, Mr. Fielding was associated tdth the industrial interests 
of central Canada, whose concerns centered around the 
maintenance of a high protective tariff. In the view of his 
western opponents. Fielding represented a class and economic
23philosophy in conplete contradiction to their oxm interests.
The former Finance Minister had always favoured a conservative
23The Globe (Toronto), July 26, 1919.
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position on the tariff, maintaining its high level to prevent 
’’interference of a serious character x-dth the business of the 
country” . A c c o r d i n g  to the loxv-tariff Liberals, Fielding’s 
candidacy represented the attempt by the power of big industry 
to control the leadership of the Liberal party.
The candidacy of the long time politician, being often 
associated xdth a special interest, encouraged conflict and 
polarization rather than consensus. Referrring to the candidacy 
of Fielding, which was already bitterly opposed on ethnic as 
well as economic grounds, and his relationship to the tariff­
conscious Canadian Association of Manufacturers, le Devoir 
predicted a probable alliance against the former Unionist:
la situation se resume a une tentative d* 
union entre l’Ouest, prétendu uni et contact, 
et le Québec, aussi reconnu tel, pour purger 
le parti de la direction suspecte qui 
voudraient lui imposer des influences 
extérieuses. 25
As xxrith regional interests, a candidate’ s affiliation xfith a
particular economic group constituted an invitation for
irréconciliable opposition to arise. Thus, the strong
identification of Fielding xyith the high tariff, industrial
^Quoted in R. M. Dax\rson, William Lyon Mackenzie King:
A Political Biography. 1874-1923 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1958), p. 392.
Z^Ernest Bilodeau, ’’Oliver contre Fielding” , Le Devoir. 
July 31, 1919.
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interests served as a polarizing agent - similar to his
synpathies for the Unionist program - creating a situation
Inhere a substantial segment of the party was placed in
unavoidable opposition to his candidacy.
The candidacy of Mr. Martin presents a further,
perhaps more exemplary, case of the inability of professional
politicians to succeed in gaining the leadership of the
Liberal party. In this case, the former Minister of Health
and Welfare had for some time been the prime exponent of
Liberal social welfare policies during the years prior to his
candidacy in 1958, Despite the xd.de constituency to which
these policies were directed, Martin was obliged nonetheless
to engage in a great degree of internal party conflict to
guarantee their success.
Martin had to fight every step of the way 
facing disagreement and doubt from Cabinet 
colleagues...In Cabinet the chief stumbling 
block xms the inevitable fear of costs, the 
reluctance to enter upon nexv spending pro­
grams. Louis St. Laurent was hesitant, C. D.
Howe unsympathetic. 26
The propensity to involvement in conflict of this variety
appeared to be the main risk incurred by long-time politicians.
biased, overstated account perhaps, but nonetheless 
somexvhat indicative of the conflict involved. J. B.Whealen,
Meet Paul Martin; A Personal Sketch (Winnipeg: Creywood, 1968) 
pp. 58-59.
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such as Paul Martin, x^ ho aspired for the party leadership.
Similar to Fielding, the candidacy of Mr. Martin 
invoked a polarization of party opinion, rather than a 
consensus. A prolonged Cabinet career and involvement in 
domestic issues had resulted in the appearance of party 
elites, such as Walter Harris and C. D. Hox^ e, who for 
personal or ideological reasons severely opposed the Martin 
candidacy.27 The polarization provoked by Mr. Martin* s 
candidacy contrasted vdth that of his opponent, Mr. Pearson, 
whose previous political background xms unconnected to 
partisan controversy of this sort.
The essence of the difficulties faced by the 
candidacies of long-time politicians, such as Fielding and 
Martin, rested in the tendency to create a polarization of 
party opinion in respect to their candidacy. The exact nature 
of the elements constituting this polarization varied, but 
it consistently involved the creation of substantial portions 
of the party whose primary interest in relation to the 
candidacy xvas negative. In the case of Mr. Fielding the 
Quebec and low tariff Liberals xvere in unalterable opposition; 
the conservative segments of the party had long been alienated
27xhese difficulties are mentioned in D. C. Thomson, 
Louis St. Laurent: Canadian . (Toronto: Macmillan, 1967) 
p. 523.
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by the rigour of Hr. Martin in the pursuit of increasing
social welfare policies; and Mr. Gardiner* s paternal
relationship to agriculture was resented by the more
sophisticated eastern politicians in the Liberal party. In
all of these instances, of course, the candidate reaped some
support from the core of his constituency within the party.
However, the success of this candidacy remained inconsistent
with the nature of the party*s leadership selection process.
The leadership candidacy of the professional
politician was usually considered to be a contradiction of the
expected approach to the selection of the party leader. It
was such an expectation which prompted Prime Minister King to
distinguish the qualities of an individual such as Mr. St.
Laurent with those of politicians such as Gardiner and Martin:
I confess much of my thoughts through the day 
were of the action of some of the men of our 
party in xvhom I have been greatly disappointed.
Chief of all was Gardiner for entering the 
race the xmy he did; trying to knife St. Laurent, 
putting out little praises of himself, etc..
His sole emphasis on machine politics. No states­
manlike outlook.. .Next I think was Martin. 28
The party leadership and its determination vms thus considered
a question of statesmanship - of conciliation end conpromise -
rather than a contribution to political conflict.
^%Iackenzie King Record, pp. cit.. p. 365.
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The rejection of the professional politician on the 
basis of incompatibility with the form of leadership 
prescribed by the prevailing rules of the game paralleled 
the failure of the political machine as a campaign weapon.
The rigorous application of campaign organization did not 
necessarily correspond to a high degree of success in the 
leadership contest. The most talented exponents of the 
"machine" - Gardiner, Hellyer, Martin - did not seem to 
gather great benefits from its use. In fact, like the 
professional politician himself, the utilization of the 
political machine was inconsistent with the apparently 
accepted form of leadership selection in the Liberal party.
In contrast to successful candidates, who expressed the idea 
that the position of party leader would seek its occupant, 
the machine politics of the professional served to indicate 
an undesirable eagerness to seize the leadership. The 
political machine itself thus seemed to reject the assumption 
that certain qualifications rather than mere political 
opportunism should determine the party leadership. As a 
consequence, the exertion of machine politics in leadership 
contests was liable to mobilize opposition, rather than 
support, for the candidacy of its most vigorous proponent.
The bias contrary to the emergence of internal conflict, 
which has characterized the rules of the game applying to
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leadership selection in the Liberal party, vTas also revealed
by the association of candidates* success xd-th certain
29Cabinet portfolios,
TABLE 6: PORTFOLIOS OCCUPIED BY LEADERSHIP CANDIDATES
Portfolios
C External Justice Finance Health Labour Agri­
a Affairs & culture
n
d
Welfare
^ St.Laurent Mackenzie® Fielding Martin King Gardiner
g Pearson St.Laurent Sharp MacEachen MacEachen Greene
f. Martin Trudeau Winters^ PowerL>
e '
Turner^
a. Solicitor General
b. Trade & Commerce
c. Consumer & Corporate Affairs
Portfolios are distributed according to the highest - in 
terms of last - occupied prior to leadership convention. Candidates 
appear txd.ce if they have been candidates at txfo separate 
conventions (Martin) or if portfolios occupied at separate times 
xfere considered relatively equal in status (St. Laurent,
MacEachen). Three candidates have been listed under a portfolio 
which they did not occupy since the effect on candidate* s 
association xdth internal conflict was approximately equal. Two 
candidates are not listed who nonetheless received Cabinet 
office (Hellyer - Defence; Graham - Railways and Canals).
Thus, the main channel used in the Cabinet careers of Liberal
leaders xyere the portfolios of Justice and External Affairs.
These were occupied by Mr. Trudeau and by Mr. Pearson respectively
9 Q  ' " " " ” " " " - r _ - - -
All information from Johnson, op. cit.
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through-out their careers as ministers, while Mr. St. Laurent 
possessed both of these posts prior to his selection as 
leader. It is interesting to note the singular lack of 
success of leadership candidates who devoted much of their 
Cabinet careers to the portfolios of Agriculture, Health and 
Welfare, and Finance. Despite the political and technical 
expertise these positions demand, they have not appeared to 
constitute strong foundations for the pursuit of the party 
leadership. Especially notable in this respect is Finance, 
which although held by some of the more illustrious figures 
in Liberal party history - Fielding, Harris, and Sharp - has 
never been occupied by an eventual party leader.
The poor leadership success of former Ministers of
departments such as Finance and Agriculture corresponds to
the bias in the leadership selection process of the Liberal
party contrary to candidates identified with particular
social interests. The portfolios of Finance, /agriculture
and to some extent Health and Welfare have tended to develop
a constituency with respect to both the department and its
minister. The development of this clientele relationship was
accompanied by the association of the minister with the
interests of his constituency. The images of candidates such
as Gardiner, Fielding and Sharp were prime examples of this 
process.
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The tendency tox/ard association with parochial 
interests incumbent upon the Ministers of Finance and Agri­
culture contrasted xfith the portfolios of Justice and 
External Affairs in which such an outcome xjas improbable.
Due to the probability of conflict xfith other party elements, 
the occupying of the former portfolios did not constitute a 
favourable basis upon which to pursue the party leadership.
All Cabinet iMinisters x^ ere concerned with the determination 
of government policy and therefore liable to involvement in 
internal conflict xTith other Cabinet members and party elites. 
Howrever, the portfolios of Finance, Health and Welfare and 
Agriculture not only favoured the association of the 
minister xd.th a particular interest, but encouraged his 
engagement in Cabinet conflict over the content of government 
policy. These ministries xvrere extremely vulnerable since 
they xfere all vitally concerned x<rith the disposition of 
scarce federal revenues for the pursuit of programs favourable
to one or another social group. The conflict concerning
30Medicare from 1966 to 1968; the struggle between xvelfare and 
development policies in the 1950* s; and the battle over consumer
As Minister of Finance, Sharp was in forefront of 
opposition to Medicare from 1966 to 1968. See J. LaMarsh. 
Memoirs of a Bird in a Gilded Cage (Toronto: McClelland and 
Stexvart, 1969), pp. 338-344.
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and producer Interests prior to the 1948 convention, 
represented conflicts occurring within the Liberal Cabinet 
between these ministers.
A propensity to participation in internal party 
conflict, deriving from association xjith certain social 
groups, has accounted for the association of certain 
ministerial positions \d.th lack of success in the selection 
of Liberal leaders. Only Mackenzie King of the Liberal 
leaders selected in this century possessed a portfolio other 
than that of External Affairs or Justice, which could be 
considered associated xvith a specific constituency. Hox^ever, 
even this one exception, due to the peculiar nature of the 
Liberal party*s philosophy and historical position toward 
l a b o u r , w a s  not strictly comparable to those of Agriculture 
and Finance. In general, occupants of ministerial positions 
conducive to the necessity of engagement in internal party 
conflict were notably unsuccessful as leadership candidates.
The Party Reformer
The failures of the professional politician and of 
the regional candidate were indicative of prevailing rules of
S^The King philosophy of labour relations stipulated 
government*s impartial, objective role, identifying itself with 
neither labour nor industry. See Dawson, op. cit., pp. 246-249 
and also Chapter VI in this vTork.
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the game diminishing the legitimacy of internal party 
conflict as a determining criterion of party leadership. 
Another form of candidacy illustrating the loxy salience of 
conflict in leadership selection consisted of the 
unsuccessful attempts to encourage a division between elite 
and ranlc-and-file within the party. Although genuine 
campaigns for party democratization by leadership candidates 
have been a rarity, some use has been made by candidates of 
strategies designed to mobilize non-elites behind their 
candidacies as a challenge to the prevailing elite of the 
party.
The candidacy of C. G. Power in 1948 represented the 
most serious attempt to appeal to the rank-and-file rather 
than to the party elite. Although the leadership chances of 
the former Cabinet Minister were at no time extensive, Mr. 
Power’s candidacy represented a protest against the "bureau­
cratization" of the Liberal party and a plea for a more 
democratic party framework.
I never had anything like a glimmer of hope 
that I would be successful; but I was coming 
more and more to the conclusion that since I 
had in the past three or four years, in the 
House of Commons, in speeches, and in 
magazine articles, protested against the 
government’s method of procedure and continued 
wartime controls, I could not at this time
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
104
whitewash the past and give a blank 
cheque for the future. This was the time,
X'/hen Liberals of all shades and degrees 
were assembled, to set forth my views, 
and if anyone wanted to vote for them 
and for x;hat I considered to be the true 
precepts of Liberalism, then I xmuld 
give him an opportunity. 32
Nonetheless, the vote total accredited to Mr. Poxzer x;as 
minimal. The strength of the "protest" candidate and the 
opportunity to register displeasure xvdth the Parliamentary
O O
elite of the party did not appear as a significant 
concern of the bulk of convention delegates in 1948.
The Power candidacy clearly constituted, due to his 
long concern over the issue and since the probability of 
his attaining the leadership xvas alxmys minimal, the only 
true "protest" against the prevailing structure of the party 
in the four Liberal leadership conventions. In later 
situations, candidates such as Paul Martin and John Turner 
attempted to precipitate a cleavage betxTcen elite and non­
elite memberbship of the party. Hoxvever, the motive in these 
cases was to further the leadership prospects of the candidate, 
rather than an exceptional concern for party reform.
32c. G. PoX‘7er, A Party Politician: The Memoirs of Chubby 
Power, ed. Norman Ward. (Toronto':' Macmillan"" 1966), p. 1^6,
resigned from the Liberal Cabinet in 1944 
and had not returned, which to a degree validated his appearance 
in opposition to the party elite.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
105
The campaign of Mr..Martin in 1958 represented the
most overt attempt to mobilize delegate support on the basis
of an ostensible democratization of the party. A statement
issued by the Martin campaign organization declared;
I knoxv and so does every delegate, that the 
time has come when the people and not the 
brass must be heard if the Liberal party 
is going to come back to power...It is 
evident that the Liberal party i s not* 
beginning to speak from the bottom up 
instead of the top doxm. 34
Predictably, the call for "democratization" xms not accompanied
by precise proposals for organizational reform of the party
structure. According to the Martin campaign, an increase in
the poxver of non-elites xmuld be accomplished by supporting
the candidate x?ho differed x/ith the current arrogance of the
party establishment;
If the brass in the Liberal party feel that 
this party can survive only by their dictates 
as a closed corporation, telling delegates hoxv 
they should think, then the time has come for 
nex-7 leadership xzith an ear to the ground and 
an eye to the future...If Mr. Martin is elected 
leader he xrill fight for these (Liberal) 
principles. He will also have the support of 
the delegates x?ho are gathered here to see 
that Liberal policies are once more dictated 
by and for the people. 35
34j. y. Broxm, quoted in The Winnipeg Free Press, 
January 15, 1958,
S^ ibid.
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This technique complimented Mr. Martin’s position in 
the leadership contest. The overxvhelming support for Hr. 
Pearson by the party elite had placed the former Health and 
Welfare Minister in a position where the mobilization of 
non-elites v/as a necessity. Using the preponderance of 
support for Mr. Pearson’s candidacy and the fact that the 
party had recently suffered a setback at the polls, Mr.
Martin hoped to emphasize a conflict of interest between the 
party as a whole and its prevailing elite and to present his 
candidacy as the champion of the party rank-and-file. In 
fact, the strategy was adopted in all probability to 
compensate for an already established situation - Mr.
Martin’s lack of support among prominent party figures. 
Certainly Mr. Martin himself, as a long-time Cabinet Minister, 
did not represent a plebian political cause and, ironically, 
he was identified as much or more xTith the party electoral 
difficulties in 1957 as was his opponent.3^ Nonetheless, 
the Martin candidacy did represent an attempt to mobilize non­
elites and utilize their support in challenging the established 
party elites.
3^See Whealen. op. cit., p. 64, who admits that this 
was a probable image of Martin in 1958,
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The attempt to associate front-running candidates, 
X7ho had already gathered superior support from the elite of 
the party, xvdLtli a party "establishment" and to further other 
candidacies by identifying them with opposition to such an 
elite group continued, although less eîsplicitly, in 1968, 
Although a minor candidate, John Turner* s approach to the 
leadership race stressed his unxzillingness to "make deals" 
VTith the party "power brokers" as had the more successful
0 7
candidates.'" Reportedly, the grouping of the Winters and 
Hellyer forces prior to the final convention ballot xms 
accompanied by an expressed desire to stop the party 
"establishment".^^ As in 1958, the attacks v?ere directed 
against the victorious candidate, xdio apparently possessed 
the majority of Cabinet and Parliamentary support.
Despite its frequent appearance, the demand for 
party reform or democratization did not appear to constitute 
a particularly significant influence in the selection of 
leaders by the Liberal party. Neither the vote totals of 
the protest candidate, Mr. Poxzer, nor of candidates such as 
Paul Martin, xdio used their proclaimed opposition to the
37gee P. Stevens and John Sayxzell "Parliament and 
Politics". Canadian Annual Rer/iexz for 1968 (Toronto: University 
of Toronto ?ressTT9F9')T?.“25; —^
38See P. C. Nexman. The Distamper of Our Times, op. cit.,
p. 468.
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party elite as a campaign strategy, demonstrate extensive 
concern with the problems thus posed. The disappointing 
results of attempts to mobilize non-elites in opposition to 
party elites, combined with the fact that no candidate has 
achieved the leadership of the party by an appeal to the 
rank-and-file against the interests of the party elite, 
again indicates that leadership selection was not generally 
interpreted as an instrument of party control of elites.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CIÎ/.PTER V 
THE PARTY LEADERS .
The failures of certain candidates to achieve the 
leadership of the Liberal party have revealed only one side 
of the patterns of activity of candidates and only one aspect 
of the rules of the game characteristic of the process of 
party leadership selection. The success of the party leaders 
themselves also constitutes a valuable indication of the 
nature of leadership selection in the Liberal Party. Previous 
analysis has shown the extent to which party leaders differed 
from unsuccessful leadership candidates in terms of their 
political background prior to selection. Thus, leaders of the 
Liberal Party have exhibited political careers which x/ere of 
relatively shorter duration, as measured by membership in 
Cabinet or Parliament, and xzhich xzere based entirely at the 
federal level.^ The political careers of unsuccessful 
candidates tended to be longer and more likely preceded 
by provincial party experience. Moreover, the careers of 
unsuccessful leadership candidates were conducive to their
^See Tables 2 to 5 in Chapter IV.
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association xzith internal party conflict and resulted in the 
usually vain attempt to introduce a competitive framexzork 
into the issue of leadership selection. In contrast to this 
feature and corresponding to their political background, the 
successful leadership candidates did not become identified 
with serious internal party conflict and illustrated a 
generally non-competitive approach to the selection of a 
party leader.
The lack of association with factional conflict 
characteristic of future party leaders derived from the 
nature of their careers as members of the party elite. The 
Cabinet career of the Liberal leader was typically not only 
extremely brief, but of such a character to place the 
minister above the vicissitudes of Cabinet conflict. In 
the cases of St. Laurent and Pearson, the occupancy of the 
External Affairs portfolio did not automatically engage them 
in overt conflict with Cabinet colleagues. The practise, 
during the later years of the King administration and in the 
St. Laurent governments, of the leader's and Cabinet's 
deferral of foreign policy to the special competence of the 
minister^ contributed to consensus rather than argument on
2see J. R. Beal, The Pearson Phenomena. (Toronto: 
Longmans, 1964), p. 89 and D. C. Thomson, Louis St. Laurent; 
Canadian. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1967), p. 202.
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these issues. Similarly, the Cabinet careers of Trudeau and
3
King xzere so extremely short as to make the opportunity for
severe personal or political animosity to arise extremely
improbable. Even given the brevity of Cabinet activity,
there was nothing particularly controversial about their
tenure. A colleague of Mr. Trudeau commented:
He did not seem to hold very informed views on 
anything. He xvas, however, alx-zays vzell prepared 
for discussions xzithin his oxzn portfolio and 
skillful in xfinning support to his ideas...
Pierre Elliott Trudeau may have had some 
feeling he was destined to be Prime Minister
...If so, he never displayed any such personal 
conviction, end behaved for the most part in a 
modest way. He xzasn't active in Cabinet and 
wasn't often present....4
Similar to the pattern of other party leaders, the Cabinet
activity of Mr. Trudeau was devoted especially to the concerns
of his portfolio rather than to a wd.de range of policy issues.
The type of portfolio possessed by the leader previous
to his selection alloxved him to disengage to a great degree
from Cabinet conflict. Since the policies articulated were
^The Cabinet careers of Trudeau and King xzere 12 and 
28 months respectively. See P. G. Normandin, ed.. The Canadian 
Parliamentary Guide. 1969. (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 196"^ ), 
p. 281 and R. M. Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King; A 
Political Biography, 1874-1923. (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, l958’)V ~
^LaMarsh, Judy. Memoirs of a Bird in a Gilded Cage. 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, l9'69')',"pp. l4'7-340.
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identified with no particular social group (Justice and 
External Affairs) or required no extensive conscription of 
government revenue (Labour under King), the portfolios 
occupied by the leaders were not antagonistic to the 
interests of colleagues. Rather than a liability, lack of 
partisanship and estrangement from domestic politics were 
evidently an advantage to a Liberal leadership candidate.^ 
Although unlikely to lead to a polarization of the 
party elite, the issues subsumed under the jurisdiction of 
the leader did give his candidacy a substantial degree of 
public eminence. The particular Cabinet office or issue - 
area in which the successful candidate xms involved was 
responsible for his attachment to an issue of national 
importance immediately prior to the occasion of the leadership 
convention. In 1948, for instance, the candidacy of Mr. St. 
Laurent xms boosted by the suitability of his personal 
characteristics and career xzith the handling of the critical 
international situation of the period. As one delegate 
remarked:
above.
5For experience of Liberal leaders, see Chapter IV,
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I'm all for young fellcxm being given a 
chance to do things and to go places, 
mind you. But with this serious world 
situation, I think the nexz man should 
be someone xyith a good sound Icnoxzledge 
of foreign affairs. 6
This attitude and reasoning was not untypical of other
elements in the party, including members of the Cabinet and
the Young Liberals.^
In much the same manner, the candidacy of Lester
Pearson in 1958 was undoubtedly favoured by his acceptance
of the Nobel Peace Prize a month prior to the leadership
convention. The reported comment of a Cabinet colleague was
perhaps not dissimilar from the responses of other delegates
to the award:
l-Jhen a man gets that kind of play outside the 
country, he's just too good to pass up at home.
We've got to like Mike. 8
To a lesser extent, comparable benefits were produced by
Mackenzie King's domination of the platform resolutions on
^Thomas McKercher, quoted in The Globe and Mail 
(Toronto), August 3, 1948.
^Ibid.. August 3-4, 1948.
^Quoted in David MacDonald, "IRio Will Lead the 
Liberals in the Campaigning to Come," The Globe Magazine. 
January 4, 1948.
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Labour at the 1919 convention^ and by Hr. Trudeau’s defence
of Canadian federalism during the confrontation xvith Quebec
permier Daniel Johnson at the 1968 constitutional conference.
On the latter case, Judy LaMarsh has speculated:
As in his predecessor's case, so timing 
(over x-zhich he had no control) wzas 
responsible for the success of Pierre 
Elliott Trudeau in 1968. For x^ithout a 
chance roxz at a televised Dominion- 
Provincial conference, January 1968,
Pierre Elliott Trudeau xfould never have 
captivated the public xzith his style. 10
Certainly Mr. Trudeau's remarkable progress in popularity polls, 
xzhich shox\zed him rise from negligible recognition as a leader­
ship prospect to the support of almost a third of the poll 
xzithin the first three months of 1968^^ substantiates the 
hypothesis that his activities as Minister of Justice during
^As a former Minister and Deputy Minister of Labour, 
King vras chairman of the preconvention committee on labour 
resolutions and chairman of the convention Capital and Labour 
Committee. As such he introduced the policy resolution to the 
convention - especially significant due to the absence of 
provision for formal speeches by leadership candidates. See 
Liberal Party of Canada. The National Liberal Convention, 
(Ottaxza, 1919), pp. 126-146.
TOl^Marsh, op. cit.. p. 324.
Tljn December, 1967 Trudeau xzas one of several 
candidates xvho together received mention by less that 3% of the 
poll; in a poll published in April of 1968 he had 32% of 
preference - 18% more than the popularity of his closest 
opponent. See The Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, Public 
Opinion News.Sheet: The Gallup Poll of Canada, Toronto,
December 2U, l9b7 and April 3, T9F5'.
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this period offered him ample opportunity to reach the 
public eye.
The significance of these variables can be considered 
to be greater than merely proving Hachiavelli's dictum that 
"fortune is the ruler of half our actions, but that she allowrs
1 n
the other half to be governed by us." The intervention of
issues which aided the candidacies of Liberal leaders is
instructive regarding the selection process due to the nature
of the questions involved. In the cases of the last three '
Liberal leaders, the problems confronted in their pre-convention
activity corresponded to responses to internal or external
threats to the nature of the Canadian state. As a result,
their candidacy and Cabinet career represented the larger
interests of the Canadian whole rather than the demands of a
parochial group. Thus, the candidacies of St. Laurent and
Trudeau x-zere linked with the recent battles against divisive
social forces lead by Premiers Duplessis and Johnson 
13respectively. In addition, St. Laurent and his successor 
xzere associated xzith the external role of the Canadian state.
Machiavelli, The Prince and the Discourses. (New 
York: Modem Library, 1950), p. 91.
^%r. St. Laurent had been active in the provincial 
election canpaigns of both 1944 and 1948 against the Union 
Nationale under Duplessis.
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Leadership, party and state were considered equally 
instrumental in the defeat of the external threat. Prior to 
the national convention of 1948, St. Laurent proclaimed that 
the "Liberal Party is still the only bulxizark against 
socialism in Canada. It tyas even necessary for Mr.
Martin in 1958 to record his concern with the priority of 
Canada's external role by assuring his opponent the retention 
of the External Affairs portfolio under his l e a d e r s h i p .
The ability of successful candidates to identify 
xd-th prevailing conceptions of the Canadian state in 
relation to external and internal threats was reflected in 
the delegate support received at the leadership convention.
In general, the party leaders vzere supported by elements of 
the federal party, xzho xzere more prone to support the present 
status of the federal system, and often opposed by provincial 
parties, xyho xzere more likely to be innovators in opposition 
to the federal status quo. The Gouin - Lapointe controversy 
over the Quebec delegation of 1919 constituted a struggle 
betxzeen provincial and federal Liberal forces. The conflict 
was resolved by the assertion of Lapointe's jurisdiction in
^^Quoted in Warren Baldwin, "St. Laurent Leadership 
Hope Slips", The Globe and Mail (Toronto), July 28, 1948.
ISgee The Globe and Mail (Toronto), January 8, 1958.
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federal matters and by the alignment behind the King 
candidacy.
They (the Quebec delegation) met in caucus 
- and actually turned Gouin doivn cold.
They told him...that he could run his own 
Local Legislature, but that they would run 
themselves in Dominion matters. 16
The role of the federal party in contributing to King*s
selection was also evidenced by the extent of Mr. Fielding* s
alliance with the bulk of provincial Liberal leaders,
The leader*s relationship to federal and provincial
parties followed a similar pattern in subsequent conventions.
In 1948, the King - St. Laurent axis included the overall
support of the federal Ontario Liberals in opposition to
the sympathies of the provincial party or "Hepburn gang" with
Agriculture Minister G a r d i n e r . There appeared again a split
in the Quebec Liberal delegation of 1968. The overwhelming
majority of federal Liberals aligned behind the candidacy of
Mr, Trudeau, but the provincial party was not entirely in
p .  308.
^^Sir Allen Aylesworth, quoted in Dawson, o£. cit.. 
l^six of eight provincial premiers were reported to
have supported Fielding. See F. A. McGregor, The Fall and Rise 
of Mackenzie King. 1911-1919. (Toronto: I4acmillan, 1962), p. 338.
ISsee M. King, The Mackenzie King Record; IV, 1947-1948. 
J. W. Pickersgill, end D. F. Forster, ed., (Toronto;University 
of Toronto Press, 1970), p. 353.
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19
favour of the federal Justice Minister. In this respect,
the support given successful leadership candidates corresponded
to a response to challenges by regional or parochial interests
to influence or control the party leadership.
The nature of the candidacies of Liberal leaders
allowed them to be conceived of as unifying symbols opposed to
the forces of divisiveness and conflict with which the images
of their opponents were identified. The support of the federal
party rather than of provincial parties manifested a commitment
to the Canadian whole rather than a particular region. Similarly,
Liberal leaders were identified in opposition to any parochial
appeal, including those to social class as well as to regions.
Peter C. Newman*s appraisal of Mr. Trudeau illustrates the
non-class status of the Liberal leader:
Unhappy to classify him as a man of either the 
political right or the political left, most of 
Trudeau*s listeners seemed happy to regard him 
simply as a man of the future. 20
The candidacy of Mr. Trudeau appeared above the partisan, 
ideological struggles engaged in by his challengers.
l^The legislative party of the Quebec Liberals and leader 
Jean Lesage were initially quite opposed. See Donald Peacock,
Joumey to Power. (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1968), pp. 262-263.
20peter C. Newman, The Distemper of our Times. (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart, 1968), p. 456.
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There was no overt conservatism in the candidacy of
the Liberal leader, despite his avoidance of involvement
with particular groups or in polarizing issues. A dynamic
element was suspected in all the Liberal leaders. The
Trudeau candidacy, for instance, was considered to mean
...that national politics was passing through 
one of its periodic upheavals when a non­
partisan outsider moves in to reform and 
recharge the system. 21
However, the dynamism or reform projected by leaders was
directed toward a reconciliation rather than toward a vested
interest. In 1919, Mackenzie King retained the support of
the progressive western Liberals, due to the fact he was
"safe" on the tariff and liable to be less an outright enemy
than his opponent. However, the King candidacy did not at
all identify itself \d.th the extreme demands of this faction
22against other elements in the party. The innovation to 
which King, Trudeau and other leaders were linked did not tend
Newman, op. cit.. p. 457.
22xhe reason for Mackenzie King* s acceptability by the 
west derived from the revision of the party platform toivard a 
more moderate tariff; "We would much rather trust the tariff to 
King than Mackenzie or Graham. The tariff is not as advanced as 
the farmer*s platform, but it meets it more than half way."
Quoted from The Lethbridge Herald in The Globe, August 9, 1919. 
Given its acceptance in the platform by the party, King could 
be considered as at least less liable to reject the moderate tariff 
idea than Fielding, who opposed the convention* s decision on the 
tariff. See Dawson, op. cit.. p. 305.
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to alienate party factions, but attempted to submerge their 
differences. The successful Liberal leadership candidate 
was not unassociated with the promise of change; however he 
was unassociated xd.th change conducive to his identification 
with party or social interests.
The Non-Competitiveness of Party Leaders
The association of successful leadership candidates 
through their political careers and other characteristics 
with issues and opinions of general rather than special 
interest corresponded to the role their candidacy played in 
leadership selection by the party. The candidacy of the 
eventual party leader represented a re-affirmation of unity 
rather than an appeal for conflict with other elites. As 
such, the ability of leaders to substitute consensual for 
competitive rules of the game has constituted the major 
variable in the inapplicability of corrpetition between elites 
as a determinant of leadership selection in the Liberal party. 
The scope of con^etition cannot be separated from the 
prevailing issues around which the competitive structure is 
constructed. Since the prevailing issue in the Liberal party 
has appeared to be the necessity of party unity, the focus 
of elite conflict has revolved around this concern. The 
successful candidates have been identified most thoroughly
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with the cause of unity: the defeated candidates usually 
were linked to the forces of disunity and diversity. The 
candidacy of the party leader was able to associate itself 
most clearly with the party battle against the challenge of 
particular factions and of the internal conflict which they 
provoked.
To promote unity instead of diversity necessitated
the articulation by the party leader of an essentially
negative approach to the question of leadership selection.
In other words, the support of the successful candidate was
typically garnered from those elements of the party who had
previously been alienated by alternative candidates rather
than from the development of a positive program of his own.
The archetypal example of this occurrence was Mr. King’s
exploitation of the antagonisms developed in the party
against the Unionist cause.
What I would like to make clear is that it 
seems to me that there was never any strong 
sentiment in favour of King personally. He 
simply represented the protest against 
conscription and the protest of those who 
wished to avenge Laurier. 23
23power, C. G., A Party Politician: The Memoirs of 
Chubby Power, ed. N. Ward. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1966), p. 376,
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Similarly, the support given to King by Iw-tariff Liberals 
was to be expected, given the protectionist views of Fielding 
and Graham.
The support devoted to the party leader reflected the
unacceptability of opponents who were apparently aligned to
party factions instead of to the Liberal party as a whole.
To some degree, the overxdielming mandate for Mr. St. Laurent
registered a rejection of the candidacy of Mr. Gardiner as
much as an endorsement of the victorious leader. One delegate
reportedly explained his advocacy of St. Laurent by maintaining
that he would "vote for anyone who could defeat Jimmy
G a r d i n e r . " 2 4  i n  1968, the success of the Trudeau organization’s
strategy in promoting their candidate as a second ballot
choice rather than risking the alienation of delegates by
pushing for a stronger first ballot total illustrated the
disinclination of the party leaders to contribute to a
polarization of opinion and the consequent ability to attract
delegate support as the least undesirable of the remaining 
o c
alternatives.
24 Quoted in The Globe and Mail. August 5, 1948.
25 Newman, oo. cit.. p. 460. Analysis of voting behaviour 
of delegates has illustrated the strategy was largely successful. 
With the exception of Hellyer supporters, who supported Winters, 
Mr. Trudeau gathered a large proportion of votes previously 
cast for other candidates. See L. Leduc, "Ballot Behaviour in a 
National Convention", Paper presented to C.P.S.A. meeting, 
Winnipeg, Manitoba, June 2-4, 1970. pp. 19-20,
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Linked to the successful candidates’ ability to
aggregate delegates opposed for various reasons to alternative
candidates, was the professed reluctance of the future leader
to capture the party leadership. In contrast to the ambitions
of many unsuccessful candidates, the party leader appeared
disinclined to seek the leadership for specific purposes,
Mr. Pearson’s attitude was not uncharacteristic;
When I look back in my career, the most amazing 
is that things just happened. Mr. Diefenbaker 
said he always had a goal and worked toward it.
Nothing like that with me. I was always alert 
for any opportunities or responsibilities or 
interesting work, but if I didn't take it on, 
it didn’t worry me. I’d do something else. I 
have never heim to any particular line. It 
was only pressure, really, that got me into 
thi s, 26
The typical approach of the eventual leader to his candidacy 
seemed to be more of an applicant sought out to fill a certain 
position, rather than a politician who was ready to advance a 
political cause or interests by attaining the leadership of 
the party. Initially, Mr. Trudeau reported that he felt the 
notion of his candidacy to be a good "joke". The attitude of 
Mackenzie King to his o\m candidacy and to that of his 
successor in 1948 indicated that certain objective qualities
2^Quoted in Beal, op. cit.. p. 101,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
124
of a candidate rather than sheer political ambition were
27considered the best measure of a potential leader.
Successful leadership candidates have avoided the
identification of their pursuit of the party leadership
t-Tith political ambitions favourable to a certain regional or
class grouping. Due to this characteristic, eventual party
leaders have represented the pursuit of a party consensus
rather than the exacerbation of internal party conflict. The
position of Quebec relative to the selection of Liberal
leaders has reinforced this consensual role of the successful
candidate. All Liberal leaders since Laurier have been
selected with the approval of the greater majority of the
delegates from the province of Quebec. This hypothesis remained
28as true of the more competitive occasions as of those 
selections which were marked by relatively minor opposition to 
the dominant candidate.2^ Despite this clear relationship of 
Quebec to the success of a leadership candidate, the party
27see King, op. cit., pp. 361-359 and Dawson, op. cit.,
p. 297.
28see McGregor, op. cit., p. 338; Dawson, op. cit., p. 307; 
and P. Stevens and J. SayiTell, "Parliament and Politic?'" in 
Canadian Anntml Review for 1963, ed. John Saycyell. (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press,' 1969), p. 26.
2^See S. P. Regenstreif, "The Liberal Party of Canada:
A Political Analysis". (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell 
University, 1963), p. 307.
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leader remained symbolic of a party consensus rather than of
a particular faction. This remained the case since the
Liberal Party had tended to give a special status to the
ethnic-cultural-regional demands of Quebec and since the
direction of this privileged status was not primarily toivard
the capture of the leadership for a Quebec partisan.
In 1919, although receiving a preponderance of
support from its delegation, Mackenzie King was sympathetic
to, but hardly a virulent partisan of, Quebec. Despite being
led by a future lieutenant of King, Ernest Lapointe, Quebec
delegates were not particularly intense partisans of any
specific candidate. Iæ  Devoir expressed their mood as
le bloc Québécois manque de direction et se 
trouve dans un 'état d’espirit uncertain et
qu’ on peut appeler négatif. 30
Among some delegates, there was an acceptance of the fact
that the Quebec delegation could exercise some influence over
the selection of a leader, but could hardly control the
leadership for itself.
We French-Canadians efface ourselves. We 
admit that the leader must be English 
Protestant, and therefore, the English 
Protestants should tell us whom they want.^^
3^Quoted in Devoir. August 5, 1919.
^^Quoted in J. W. Lederle, "The National Organization of 
the Liberal and Conservative Parties in Canada", (Unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation. University of Michigan, 1942), p. 70,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
126
Therefore, Mackenzie King’s candidacy could not be considered 
controlled by a particular segment of the party. Indeed,
King took great pains to dissociate himself from any such 
notion since the identification would have tended to alienate
oo
other elements within the Liberal Party.
The Quebec Liberals were not primarily interested in 
the control of the party leadership, but did demand the 
possession of a veto on candidates who were absolutely 
unacceptable. The veto situation waa characteristic of 
Mr. Fielding’s unsuccessful candidacy in 1919. Due to his 
stand on wartime conscription, in which he deserted the 
Liberal party to vote as an independent sympathizer of the 
Unionists, the former Finance Minister had incurred the 
complete enmity of the federal wing of Quebec Liberals. 
Despite the lack of an overwhelming positive direction in 
favour of a certain candidate, the views of the delegation 
toward Fielding were clear:
...plus la plupart d’entre eux se sentent
une irresistible repulsion a' voter en
faveur de M. Fielding, 33
32see Dawson, op, cit,. p, 325,
S^Bllodeau, Emest, "M, Fielding et le Bloc Québécois" 
Le Devoir. August 5, 1919,
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The application of the "alternation" principle, by 
which French-Canadian Quebeckers have occupied the leadership 
of the party, has also not been enblema.tic of Quebec control 
of the leadership. The French-Canadian leader emphasized 
his attachment to the federal concept rather than to a 
parochial loyalty. The relationship of Mr. Trudeau to the 
support of the Quebec delegates in 1968 was only indirect, 
since he was apparently considered by more effective leaders 
of the Quebec Liberals, such as Jean Marchand, to be an 
acceptable candidate to both English as well as French 
Canadians. Personally, Trudeau was considered to have no 
independent, Quebec power b a s e . ^4 Similarly, the previous 
French Canadian leader, Mr. St. Laurent, symbolized the 
partnership itself of French and English Canada rather than 
the interests of one particular member. Indeed, the most 
virulent attacks directed against the Minister of Ezctemal 
Affairs came from the nationalist element in the province 
of Quebec. In a public address, a member of the Union 
Nationale party stressed that nationalists could not consider 
St. Laurent representative of Quebec;
34See LaMarsh, o£. cit.. p. 353,
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Je me rejouirais le premier, si un Canadien 
français était appelé a devenir premier 
ministre du Canada.,.mais a condition que 
ce soit un veritable Canadien français et non 
un impérialiste qui n’a de français que le nom.35
The tradition of "alternation" did not involve the alternation 
of control by regional or ethnic groups over the party leader­
ship: it merely represented an affirmation of the unity upon 
which both the Canadian political system and the Liberal 
party were based.
The relationship between leadership candidates and 
the Quebec wing of the party illustrates the intertwining 
of the requirement of party unity and the nature of the party 
ideology. To maintain the adherence of French Canadian elites 
to the Liberal party, it was necessary for the group to possess 
some form of effective influence on party output, including 
leadership. Although control of the leadership would be 
detrimental to the unity of the party, the Quebec Liberals 
could exert influence in the form of a virtual veto over 
unacceptable leaders and by the establishment in the practice 
and ideology of the party leadership of the principle of 
"alternation". In many respects, the virtual veto possessed 
by Quebec in Liberal leadership selection became a practical,
^^Paul Bouchard, quoted in Le Devoir. July 16, 1948,
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and the principle of alternation an ideological, recognition 
of the requirements of party unity, and thereby electoral 
success.
This was illustrated no more cogently than in the
rejection of Mr. Fielding in 1919. The candidacy was totally
unacceptable to Quebec and those other Liberals loyal to the
idea symbolized by Laurier, of the partnership of English
and French Canadians:
,,, I should not wd. sh to stand in the way of any 
of our friends who had been loyal to Sir Wilfrid 
in the last political contest. I would be quite 
unwilling, howrever, to stand aside for anyone 
who helped to divide the Liberal party at that 
time, 36
The real threat of Mr. Fielding*s candidacy was not solely to
the interests of a particular group - Quebec, but injurious
to the welfare of the party as a whole by encouraging its
dissolution.
I would think it not far xvrong to say it was 
’conscription* that defeated Fielding. For 
myself at any rate, the one thing that I tvas 
bound to do everything I could to accomplish, 
xjas to prevent any man who had deserted Laurier 
in 1917 becoming our leader in 1919 - because 
such a result I believed would have utterly 
disrupted and destroyed the party. I know that a 
great many \dio were at the Convention had 
exactly the same feeling - and I think it was a 
very powerful factor in electing King.,,.37
S^King, quoted in Dawson, o£. cit.. p. 297.
37c. Murphy, quoted in H. S. Ferns and B, Ostry; The 
Age of Mackenzie King: The Rise of the Leader. (London: William 
Heinemann, 1955), p. 317.
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It was therefore in the interests of the party as a whole to 
recognize the veto of the Quebec group against a particular 
candidate and to select a leader generally acceptable to both 
Quebec and the remaining sections of the federal party.
In conclusion, the success of Liberal party leaders 
as candidates has derived from their consensual character, 
rather than from the capture of a particular faction of the 
party. In the sense that they avoided any polarization of 
party opinion on the selection issue, the activity of Liberal 
leaders as candidates cannot be considered as primarily 
competitive in character. In conventions, such as 1968 and 
to a lesser extent in 1919, when several challengers for 
the leadership existed, the association of success \7ith an 
essentially non-competitive, consensual candidate is more 
predictable as the latter could be considered a particularly 
advantageous candidate strategy. However, in 1948 and 1958, 
when opponents were few and their strength meagre, the leader’s 
position in the center of the party still remained applicable.
Candidates and Leaders: The Rules of the Game end Preselection
A high degree of competition betvjeen elites for non­
elite support has not generally been a dominant characteristic 
of leadership selection in the Liberal party. The most 
successful candidates - the party leaders - identified with
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the interests of the party as a whole, rather than a particular 
faction, and tended to provoke consensus, rather than conflict. 
Only infrequently did candidacies appear which represented 
careers or interests emblematic of conflict within the party. 
Some candidates who T^re associated, through their political 
background, did attempt to introduce competition into the 
process of leadership selection. However, these candidacies 
Ti/ere consistently unable to prevent the ascendancy of the 
leader who identified izLth party unity and consensus. Thus, 
the lack of success of the professional politician, regional 
representative and party reformer indicates that limitation 
of conflict in the selection of leaders was associated with 
rules of the game tending to discourage the appearance of 
internal party conflict, and hence, of elite competition. The 
result of these rules has been to accord a minimal degree of 
legitimacy to serious conflict between elites and thereby to 
discourage competition for non-elite support.
The nature of preselection as well as the rules of the 
game suggest the lack of legitimacy given to internal conflict 
as a determinant in the selection of Liberal leaders. The 
characteristics of candidates indicate that the process of 
preselection has operated with a bias contrary to candidates 
associated ivith party conflict. Candidates have not emerged
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with great frequency from distinct, parochial interests to 
contest the leadership. With few exceptions, candidates have 
been recruited from the centre - the federal Parliamentary 
and Cabinet elite - rather than from the margins - provincial 
parties and governments or particular party factions - of 
Liberal party activity. As a whole, preselection has been 
centripetal rather than centrifugal in direction and 
significance.
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CHAPTER VI
THE LIBERAL IDEOLOGY AND THE SELECTION OF LEADERS
The ideological element in party life refers to those 
collective values or beliefs which express the orientation of 
the political party to its social and political environment,^
To a great extent, party ideology serves to define the 
status of internal conflict or solidarity as values within the 
party and to stipulate the role of leadership in respect to 
these variables. Thus, the ideological character of a party 
constitutes a basic influence on the relative consensual or 
competitive nature of leadership selection.
The most prominent ideological trait of the Liberal 
Party in the twentieth century has been its conscious effort
^ As an organization promoting group activity, the
political party must exhibit an ideological framework, at least 
in order to justify its oim existence. In most parties the 
ideological framework will also include a legitimation of 
the political regime and other social systems. See Max Weber, 
From Max Weber; Essays in Sociology, ed. Hans Gerth and C. W. 
Mills (New York; Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 194. An 
ideology is neither synonymous X'/ith the belief-systems of 
individual members or to the actual situation of the party in 
relation to external reality. The political belief-system, 
which consists "of the set of beliefs according to which 
individuals navigate and orient themnelves in the sea of 
politics," - Sartori, Giovanni, "Politics, Ideology and Belief 
Systems," American Political Science Review. LRIII (June, 1969), 
400 - relates to ideology only in respect to the correspondence
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to "unify" rather than "divide" the Canadian social system. 
In consequence of this and of the high importance accorded 
to leadership in achieving it, party definition of the 
leadership role has stressed its ability to personify this 
characteristic. Thus the leaders of the Liberal party have 
consistently stressed their identification with Liberal 
formulas of national unity - the recognition of the partner­
ship of English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians, the 
conception of the Liberals as a non-class, "center" party, 
and finally the idea that the Liberal Party provided for 
the government of "all" of Canada rather than government in 
the interests of particular regions.
The leadership of the Liberal Party has perhaps been 
most exemplary in its representation of the unity betxyeen 
French and English Canadians. The words of a former leader, 
Mr. St, Laurent clearly express the pattern by which the 
Canadian state is viewed;
^of some beliefs xd.th a justification for adherence 
to the collective activity of a group or institution. Ideology 
may not correspond to the actual character of reality. The 
fact that it represents to varying degrees a distortion of 
reality does not however detract from the function it nonethe­
less performs. For a discussion of ideology’s role in social­
izing individuals’ beliefs with collective activity and 
ideology’s "false consciousness", see Karl Mannheim. Ideology 
and Utopia. (New York; Harcourt, Brace and World, 193F)
p. 21,
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...our nation was planned as a political partner­
ship o£ two great races; it was planned by men of 
vision, of tolerance, as a partnership in which 
both of the partners would retain their essential 
characteristics, their religion, their language, 
their culture. To realize that plan, to make it 
X7ork, has elx^ays required and still requires a 
practical recognition in the government of the 
partnership of those two historic races, 2
The ideal of "partnership" has been carried into the practice
of Liberal leadership by the principle of "alternation".
The concept of "alternation" is more than a mere observation
of the fact that English-Canadian and French-Canadian names
have alternately occupied the position of party leader.
Although the suitability of the principle xvas not necessarily
favoured, a survey of the 1968 leadership convention revealed
a vast majority of delegates recognized the existence of such
a "Tradition" and indeed ballots for individual candidates
O
were explained, (or rationalized) on this basis.
The principle of alternation cannot be claimed to be 
an exclusive determinant of party leadership. However, it 
would seem at least a marginal consideration even at the 
level of convention balloting. Moreover, the belief in the
n
St. Laurent, L. S., quoted in D. C. Thomson, Louis 
St. Laurent; Canadian. (Toronto; Macmillan, 1967), p. 528.
3See S. P. Regenstreif, "Note on the ’Alternation’ of 
French and English Leaders of the Liberal Party of Canada", 
Canadian Joumal of Political Science, III (March, 1969), 
118-122.
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"partnership" idea imbedded in the Liberal party has had the 
effect of facilitating the recruitment of French-Canadian 
elites with leadership potential,4 as well as socializing 
party cadres to the acceptability of French-speaking 
Canadians as leaders. Both of these circumstances would be 
difficult, for instance, given the prominent ideology of the
5
Conservative party. The search for what x^ as felt to be the 
"necessary" Quebec candidate prior to the 1968 leadership 
convention, regardless of his leadership chances, illustrates
^Ernest Lapointe and Louis St. Laurent are txm of the 
more prominent examples. The latest and most comprehensive
recruitment included the trio of Marchand, Trudeau and 
Pelletier. See P. C. Nexvman, The Distemper of Our Times.
(Toronto: McClelland and Stexmrt, 1968), pp. 370-372. In relation 
to the integration of French-Canadian elites, it may be useful 
to consider the function of the Liberal party in promoting or 
maintaining a stable democratic system by "consociational" 
means - "Democracies with subcultural cleavages and xd.th tendencies 
toxvard immobilism and instability which are deliberately turned 
into more stable systems by the leaders of the major subcultures.." 
See Arend Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems", in 
Politics in Europe; Comparisons and Interpretations, A. Lijphart 
éd. (Englewood Cliffs; Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. 63. For an 
application of this scheme to the Canadian political system, 
see S. J. R. Noel, "Political Parties and Elite Accommodation: 
Interpretations of Canadian Federalism", A paper presented to the 
annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, 
University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, June 1970, pp. 21-34.
^The Conservative party has not had a French-speaking 
leader nor has such an individual been considered for the post, 
either in convention or wdthin inner party circles. See D. Peacock, 
J oumey to Power. (Toronto; Macmillan, 1968), pp. 13-109; P. C. 
Nexvman, Renegade in Power. (Toronto; McClelland and Stexyart, 1963), 
pp. 24-31, 44-47; and Ruth M. Bell, "Conservative Party National 
Conventions, 1927-1956". Unpublished Master’s thesis, (Carleton 
University, 1965).
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clearly the legitimate role which the Quebec membership 
perceived it possessed within the leadership race,^
In addition to its influence on the alternation 
principle, the value of English and French Canadian partner­
ship has been reflected in the character of the French- 
Canadian leaders of the party. Including Sir Wilfrid Laurier, 
each have personified the conception of the Canadian state as 
a partnership betx^een the two major ethnic groups. As well 
as being fluently bilingual, the leaders* family and 
educational backgrounds epitomized the reconciliation of 
dualism with unity.^ By exposure to both sides of the
&See Nexvman, The Distemper of Our Times, op. cit.. pp. 
402-403 and Peacock, o^. cit.. p. 222. During consultations 
concerning the candidate to be representative of French Canada, 
Prime Minister Pearson was reported to have said; "This is a 
tradition of the Liberal Party - and he may or may not win.
But he must be a good candidate and get a lot of votes, and 
\<re must shoxf that although the Tories can’t we can alxyays 
come up with an alternative from Quebec." Quoted in P. Stevens 
and J. Saywell, "Parliament and Politics", in The Canadian 
Annual Review for 1968 ed, J. Sayxmll. (Toronto; University 
of Toronto Press, 1969;, p. 17.
?Both Trudeau and St. Laurent came from families of 
mixed ethnic backgroxmd. These txvo leaders and Sir Wilfrid 
Laurier had early exposure to English language or culture due 
to family or educational experience. The former pair used 
English as a home language. See Thomson, op. cit.. Douglas 
Stuebing, al., Trudeau; A Man for Tomorroxy." (Toronto; 
Clarke, Irxd.n, 1968), pp. 5-6 and Joseph Schull, Laurier;
The First Canadien. (Toronto; Macmillan, 1965), pp. 19-24.
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Canadian partnership, these leaders represented a biethnic as
xvell as a bilingual fusion.
The fusion of the two ethnic identities into a single
individual was directly related to the form of leadership
characteristic of the Liberal Party. In explaining the
inapplicability of the principle of "dual leadership" in the
St. Laurent Cabinet of 1948, one historian has remarked:
The characteristics of the two groups were 
interxTOven in the Prime Minister’s otm 
personality, and he was no more able to 
conceive of a cabinet composed of two teams 
representing two separate groups than he was of 
splitting his own personality. 8
Thus, in a very real sense, the political leadership of St.
Laurent represented a transcendence of the dualism upon
which the Canadian partnership was founded.
The fusion of the two ethnic groups, which these
Liberal leaders exemplified, and the subsequent form of
leadership in which it resulted, meant that the French-
English partnership and the principle of alternation of
leaders represented a unifying rather than a disintegrating
^Thomson, D. C., "The Cabinet of 1948", in Cabinet 
Formation and Bicultural Relations, ed. F. W. Gibson,
Volume VI oï~Studies of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism 
and Biculturalism. (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1970), p. 154.
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ideology. The Liberal leaders from French Canada interpreted 
their leadership and the nature of French-English partnership 
within a predominating belief in the supremacy of the partner­
ship over either of its constituent parts. Demands for the 
illegitimate patronage of one "partner” - French Canada - 
xvere thus not consistent with the partnership ideal. In his 
approach to the issue. Prime Minister St. Laurent
... saxy the relationship between French and 
English Canadians not as a group, but on an 
individual basis, as citizens of the same 
state, with equal rights...Concomitant with 
this principle of ’practical equality' xms 
his insistence that French Canadians should 
demonstrate their competence to occupy 
postions of responsibility and not demand a 
percentage of them merely as a right. 9
The resistance to parochial challenges to the unity represented
by the partnership idea v/as further pointed out by Mr. Trudeau’s
position on the nationalist propensities of French Canada.
...the nationalists...are politically reactionary 
because, in attaching such importance to the idea 
of nation, they are surely led to a definition 
of the common good as a function of an ethnic 
group, rather than of all the people, regardless 
of characteristics. 10
Thus, as the French-Canadian leader of the Liberal party
represented the partnership as a whole rather than merely one
^Thomson, "The Cabinet of 1948", oo. cit.. p.144.
^^Trudeau, P. E., Federalism and the French Canadians. 
(Toronto: Macmillan, 1968), p. 169.
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of its members, the ideology of French-English partnership
accorded a special place to French Canada only in terms of
the perceived coincidence of its interests xvith those of
Canadian unity. In this manner, the partnership idea
contributed to the party ideology’s general emphasis on the
value of political solidarity end unity.
A second quality of the Liberal Party is its non-
class orientation,which some observers have claimed to
be the definitive characteristic of the party relative to
12
the Canadian party system. ' A former Cabinet Minister 
explained the party position in this manner:
Ifn terms of electoral support the non-class ethos of 
the Liberal party seems to be mirrored in reality. See R. R. 
Alford, Party and Society. (Chicago: Pvsnd-McNally, 1963), p. 253; 
also Alford, "The Social Basis of Political Cleavage in 1962", 
Papers on the 1962 Election, ed. John Meisel. (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1964), p. 209. On the other hand, 
the argument has been advanced that non-class ideologies may 
originate from a specific social class, such as the petite 
bourgeoisie. See R. Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in 
Industrial Society. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), 
p. 99. Certainly the Liberals have been attacked as a "class" 
party by critics such as Stanley Knowles, The Nexv Party.
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1961), pp. 2-5. Hoxvever, 
whether or not in terms of policy output the party has been 
"non-class" is immaterial to the non-class nature of its 
ideology.
12See Alford or?, cit.. p. 253; Gad Horowitz, Canadian 
Labour in Politics. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1969), p. 29; and S. P. Regenstreif, The Diefenbaker Interlude. 
(Toronto: Longmans, 1964), p.
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The Liberal view is that true political progress 
is narked by...the reconciliation of classes, and 
the promotion of the general interest above all 
particular interests. 13
This belief in the substitution of community interest for the
interests of a particular group or class has also been
reflected in the attitudes and characteristics of Liberal
leaders. Thus, in many xmys the contribution of Mackenzie
King as an intellectual to the field of industrial relations
mirrored the stance of the Liberal Party with respect to
labour policy.
A solution to the problems of industry is not to 
be looked for in forms. .A nexy spirit alone wd.ll 
suffice. This spirit must...breathe mutual 
confidence and constructive good-will. It must be 
founded on a belief in an underlying order which 
presupposes betxjeen individuals, not conflict, 
but community of interest in all that pertains 
to human well-being. 14
As a politician, Mr. King believed in the Liberal Party as the
instrument of this reconciliation:
As the bulxmrk of freedom. Liberalism stands mid­
way betX'jeen those forces that seek the protection 
of special privilege or vested interests...and 
those forces that seek the control of the nation’s 
in the interest of one or more classes or economic 
groups. 15
^^Pickersgill, J. W.. The Liberal Party. (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart, 1962;, p. 68.
^4King, W. L. M., Industry and Hximanity. (Toronto: ,T. Allen, 
1918), p. 148.
^^King, W. L. M., "Address by the Right Honourable W. L. 
Mackenzie King on his Years of Leadership - and Reasons for 
Retirement as Party Leader", (Ottawa: National Liberal
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Finally, the party ideology has tended to emphasize
the Liberals’ character as a truly "national", i.e. federal,
party. In the prevailing party view, only a "national"
party, such as the Liberal, is capable of coalescing the
various parochial strains emanating from the diverse
regions of Canada. Consequently the party
.. .must esqpress only the highest common factors 
behind which majority support can be mobilized 
...We occupy half a continent; there is enormous 
diversity of regional economic interest..
Government in this country can be carried on only 
by alliances, by forming coalitions of regional 
and other interests. 16
Thus, the Liberal party becomes the political vehicle
transcending the diversity of the Canadian social structure.
In contrast to the party as a whole, represented by
its membership, and to governmental institutions such as the
Senate and Cabinet, in which a simple principle of
representation can be applied, the party leader was obliged
to stand alone as a symbol of the all-inclusive nature of
the p a r t y . T h i s  fact itself was sufficient to influence 
the successful political leader to eschew identification
1^Jewett, Pauline, Canadian Liberalism; Its Philosophy. 
Party pamphlet ivith no date. pp. 1-2.
Duverggr speaks of "scientific democracy" in this 
context - proportional representation according to regional or 
other affiliation. See M. Duverger, Political Parties.(London; 
Methuen, 1954), p. 158. This has not been applicable given the 
historical definition of Prime Ministerial leaders. Only one 
individual has possessed both the formal and informal authority 
of the leader, despite prevalent myths concerning "dual leader- 
shin". See F. W. Gibson. "Conclusions", in Gibson on. cit.. n . 155.
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xd-th particular regional interests. However, reinforcing 
this situation has been the tendency of parties governing 
over a long period of time at the federal level, to associate 
themselves with the "centralist" points of view expressed by 
the federal career bureaucracy. Certainly the Liberal Party, 
in terms of its policies^^ and of its recruitment practices, 
has not been independent of these influences.
The consequence of such factors was to emphasize the 
"national” nature of a leader’s role as a criterion for 
leadership selection. In fact, the leaders of the Liberal 
Party since Laurier have satisfied this criterion to the 
extent that both their careers and belief-systems have 
coincided with the party’s definition of national rather than 
regional patterns. In contrast to leaders of the Conservative 
Party and unsuccessful Liberal candidates, such as J. G, 
Gardiner and Eric Kierans, the leaders of the Canadian Liberals 
in the 20th century have had no appreciable career in 
provincial politics.
See John Meisel, The Canadian General Election of 1957. 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), p. 38 for an 
identification of the influence of the federal bureaucracy on 
the 1957 Liberal election platform.
l^See J. Porter, The Vertical Mosaic. (Toronto; University 
of Toronto Press, 1965), pp. 405-415. Such national career 
patterns are also characteristic of British party elites. See 
Richard Rose, Politics in England; An Interpretation. (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1967), p. 90.
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The predominance of career patterns at the federal
level of government has paralleled the existence of belief- 
systems emphasising a "federal" view of the Canadian state.
In this view, the viability of the Canadian federal system, 
represented by the existence of a federal, "Canadian", 
national government, is to be protected against the centri­
fugal forces operating within the constitutent regions. The 
most ardent defender of this outlook, in intellectual terms, 
is the present leader, Mr. Trudeau;
It is now becoming obvious that federalism has all 
along been a product of reason in politics. It xyas 
b o m  of a decision by pragmatic politicians to face 
facts as they are, particularly the fact of the 
heterogeneity of the world’s population. It is an 
attempt to find a rational compromise based on the 
will of the people. 20
As federal Minister of Justice during a period of
constitutional "crisis", Mr. Trudeau’s viewpoints on the
issue of "Canadianism" vjere perhaps his most significant
contribution to the political scene prior to the 1968
convention. Thus, in the government publication Federalism
for the Future prepared under his supervision, the view was
exp re s sed that ;
^^Trudeau, op. cit.. p. 195.
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A constitution is more than a legal document; it 
is an expression of how the people within a state 
may achieve their social, economic, and cultural 
aspirations...Canada’s identity is its diversity 
and its unity; we lose ourselves if we lose our 
ttyo linguistic communities, our diverse cultural 
heritages, or our several regional identities.
We lose them all if we lose the Canada in which 
they have been able to exist and develop. 21
As a result of his long legal practice and tenure
as Minister of Justice, the former leader, Mr. St. Laurent
occupied a similar ideological position. As a counsel for
the federal government, a member of the Rowell Sirois
Commission, a president of the Canadian Bar Association and
prominent figure in the preparation of the post-war "Creen
Boole" proposals, Mr. St. Laurent’s background was consistently
associated with institutions or beliefs emphasizing "federal"
rather than "regional" interests within the Canadian political
system.
The association of Liberal leaders ifith federal careers 
and belief systems did not, of course, extend to a negation 
of the federal systeia itself by resorting to unitary govern­
ment . The King-Lapointe defence of provincial autonomy in the
2lThe Government of Canada. Federalism for the Future. 
(Otta;va: Queen’s Printer, 1958), p. 10.
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29
1920’s and a similar stance by Mr. Trudeau at the 1966
23National Liberal Conference, in contrast to the centralizing 
tendencies of the post-war party, are illustrative of this 
point. Rather it was the defence of federalism, and there­
fore of Canadian national unity, combined with the pragmatic 
adoption of certain interpretations of it, depending on the 
political situation, which constituted the essence of the 
Liberal ideology. Thus, in his approach to a particular 
problem of the constitutionality of federal policy Mackenzie 
King "had no e:tplicit theory of the economic responsibilities 
of a federal government...For him it was a political problem".
In the conduct of party affairs, as well as governmental policy, 
a similar approach was evident. The federal nature of the 
party necessitated a balance between the interests of presenting
a unifying national party end the legitimate demands of
25provincial party autonomy.
22 See Kenneth McNaught, A Prophet in Politics. (Toronto; 
University of Toronto Press, 1959), p. 10.
23 See The Clobe and Mail, October 13, 1966.
24 Neatzby, H. B., William Lyon Mackenzie King: 1924-1932. 
The Lonely Heights. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), 
p. 222. This thesis is also borne out by other analyses of the 
king era. See J. R. Mallory, Social Credit and the Federal Power 
in Canada. (Toronto; University of Toronto Press, 19547, p. 189 
and McNaught, op. cit., pp. 176-181.
o c
Thus, despite great divergence in philosophy, person­
ality, and policy, federal and provincial parties coexist under
identical labels. See N. McKenty Mitchell Hepburn. (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart, 1968) and M.' A. Urmsby, "Ï. Dufferin
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In intraparty as well as interparty politics a 
dominant ideological theme was the recognition of the role 
of the federal formula in preserving Canadian unity. The 
essential qualifiaction of the successful leader was there­
fore an identification, as measured by eîiplicit beliefs or 
by consonant career patterns, vTitli this formula and id.th 
the corresponding conception of the party leader.
Ideology and Party Leadership
Party ideology provides an important theoretical link 
between the nature of party and the form of political leader­
ship which it possesses. Research into the leadership of 
groups has asserted that leadership is conducted within a 
framework imposed by the group’s conception of its collective 
purpose and of the normal procedures for achievement of this 
p u r p o s e . I n  some respects, therefore, leadership is 
selected and persists in response to its adherence to the
2^Patullo and the Little New Deal”, in The Politics of 
Discontent, ed. R. Cook. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1957). For a study of this situation in another Canadian party, 
see E. R. Black, "Federal Strains Within a Canadian Party", 
in Party Politics in Canada. ed. I-I. G. Thorbum. (Scarborough: 
Prentice-IIall, 196TJ.
26see E. P. Hollander, Leadership, Groups, and Influence. 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 11,
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collective values of the group or organization involved:
The dominant belief determines the legitimacy 
of a leader, in the sociological sense of the 
tern "legitimate". 27
The significance of party ideology rests in its 
preeminent role as a determinant of political attitudes 
v/ithin the party. Although it represents a cognitive 
response to external conditions, ideology also vitally 
affects the internal activity of the political party. 
Depending on the nature of the party, ideological reaction 
to the environment will involve the articulation of goals 
which are directed to both external and internal needs.2# 
Regardless of their internal or external basis, internal 
party processes lyill nonetheless be influenced by the 
character of these goals. The goals defined by the party 
ideology constitute the normative foundation upon which party
27Duverger, op. cit.. p. 133.
28External goals or needs are defined in relation to the 
party’s performance in the political system as a whole, e.g. the 
pursuit of electoral success. In contrast, goals and needs 
defined in terms of the party’s membership can be considered 
"internal". An example of internal needs and goals are those 
deriving from the necessity of creating a "social movement". For 
a discussion of the dialectic between the latter internal goal 
and the external goal of electoral success in a Canadian party, 
see Walter D. Young, The Anatomy of a Party: The National ÇCF, 
1932-1961. (Toronto:*llniversity ÔÎ Toronto Press,' 1969), 
passim.
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activity is based. Consequently, the nature of the party 
ideology dictates the form of political subculture xd-thin 
which all internal party processes occur.
Diagram 2: Party Ideology And Leadership Selection
POLITICAL SYSTEM (EtîVIPvONIîEI-ÎT)
PARTY
POLITIC SELECTION 
OF LEADER
- preselection
- rules of the gamesübcultQr 
/
I 
I 
I k 
k 
\
\
INTERNAL PARTY (DALS
POLITICAL
PARTY_____
IDEOLOGY''^
EXTERNAL 
PARTY ^
GOALS^
SUBCULTURE
In this manner, party ideology is a vital factor 
shaping the context in which party leadership operates and in 
which it is selected. The interaction of leaders and of 
potential leaders or candidates is conducted xvithin and, to
OQ ............ ' '
As party has been considered a system of political 
behaviour, it is permissible to speak of a political culture, (or 
subculture, since the party is clearly operating vdthin a wider 
political and cultural system), applicable to this activity.
Political culture is the set of attitudes, beliefs and senti­
ments which give order and meaning to a political process and 
which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern 
behavior in the ... system". Pye, L. W., "Political Culture in 
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Volume XII, 
ed. D. L. Sills. (New York: Free Press, 1 % 8 ) , p. 218.
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some extent, resolved by the ideological character of the
institution or group involved. The prevailing rules of
candidate and elite behaviour thus reflect these ideological
traits. Moreover, party ideology xyill substantially
influence the f o m  of preselection characteristic of the
leadership selection process. Txi70 manifestations of the
influence of ideological considerations on the process of
selecting leadership are thus apparent: the characteristics
of individuals who through "preselection" are eliminated at
30various levels of the selection process, and the rules 
of the game tdiich govern interaction among these elites 
and betxTeen elites and other members of the organization.
The ideology of the Liberal party xvas not merely a 
philosophical guide to action, but also to a great eictent 
corresponded to the actual position of the party in the 
Canadian political system. In terms of electoral support, 
the Liberal party appealed to a broad range of class, 
regional and ethnic groups, as well as representing through 
its elite cocposition the co-operation of the two major
^^The emergence of candidates represents only the 
highest stage of the selection process at which "preselection" 
occurs. See Kenneth Prewitt, "From the Many are Chosen the Fex^\ 
American Behavioural Scientist. XIII (November-December, 1969), 
169-188.
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ethnie identities. It is this electoral characteristic 
which xvas seen to account for the preeminent success of the 
Liberal party at the national level. As electoral success 
constituted the preeminent concern of the party, a natural 
consequence ims adherence to an ideology which xms perceived 
to ezgress the formula for the achievement of this goal.
The primacy of electoral success also tended to 
promote the inportance of this external goal at the expense 
of alternative, internal goals. Since the external goal 
of electoral success was predominant, the formulas 
corresponding to this objective constituted the major 
ideological framework xyithin which party activity was 
conducted. Thus, the emphasis on consensus characteristic of 
Liberal ideology became the dominant feature of the political 
subculture xvhich governed the internal processes of the 
party, including the selection of leader.
The form of preselection characteristic of Liberal 
leadership selection was consistent xfith the dominance of 
the party’s consensual ideology. In the process of reduction 
or preselection in respect to the emergence of leadership 
candidates, consensual rather than conpetitive qualifications 
tended to prevail. Few candidates were associated, through 
previous political behaviour, xvith parochial groups or
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institutions \7hich could form a basis for a competitive 
leadership struggle. Those candidates who xmre so disposed 
did not succeed in becoming party leaders. Thus, the 
characteristics of Liberal leaders reveals further the nature 
of preselection applicable to the party. Hie political back­
ground of the party leader tended to stress identification 
xd.th the membership and ideology of the party, (and of the 
political system), as a xjhole. In general, preselection in 
respect to candidates and leaders in the Liberal party 
directed the process toward the center and consensus rather 
than to the periphery and conflict.
Tlie influence of the party ideology was further 
reflected in the rules of the game describing the behaviour 
of candidates and elites xd-thin the selection process. The 
introduction of competition or conflict as significant rules 
for candidate behaviour x-zas infrequent. Generally, the 
resolution of leadership selection x-ms accomplished by the 
application of non-competitive or consensual rules of the 
game. Candidates, X'jho failed to abide by these consensual 
rules x^ ere notably unsuccessful in their pursuit of the 
leadership. In contrast, the eventual party leaders were 
most successful as candidates by pursuing consensus instead 
of conflict. Consequently, success x^ as equated xvdLth resemblance
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to the highest common denominator - the party; failure often 
consisted in alignment xzith only a particular segment of the 
organization.
Leadership selection in the Liberal party xvas 
accomplished x-dthin the limits established by the character 
of preselection and of the prevailing rules of the game. The 
exact nature of the latter parameters corresponded to the 
dominant features of the party ideology. Tlius, Liberal 
leaders have not been chosen independent of the influence - 
in this case, ideological - of the political party. Hox^ever, 
this is not to deny, leaders xvhen established, do not them­
selves profoundly shape the party ideology. In fact, the 
interaction of leadership and ideology is reciprocal, xfith 
the rules of candidate behaviour end preselection representing 
the intermediate stage of ideology’s influence on the 
form of leadership.
The significance of this relationship in the Liberal 
party has consisted in its remarkable congruence over the 
period from 1919 to 1968. Related to this congruence of 
party ideology and leadership, is the long, unchallenged 
tenure of Liberal leaders during this period. Hoxyever, it is
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Diagram 3: Party Leadership And Party Ideology
IDEOLOGY
RULES OF GAME SELECTION PARTY
PRESELECTION LEADER
also connected xjlth the inordinately effective performance of 
the Liberal party in terms of its primary goal of electoral 
success. The tenure of leadership has been considered to be 
related to the degree of electoral success of the party. This 
relationship alone is unable to account for instability of
leadership in some parties, even xdien electoral success is
present - for ejcaraple the Diefenbaker experience of the 
Conservative governments of the early 1960* s. The experience 
of the Liberal party suggests that electoral success and 
security of leadership tenure are most complimentary xdien 
the party has both accepted the unqualified preeminence of the
former goal, and possesses an elaborate ideology which promotes
its dominant position.
31see P. C. Neivman, Renegade in Power, on. cit., pp. 353-
382.
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS
The preceding argtiment has investigated variables 
indicating the intensity and scope of conflict over the issue 
of leadership selection in the Liberal Party of Canada - the 
structure of the mechanism of selection, the character of 
preselection, and the nature of the rules of the game 
governing participant behaviour. The analysis has revealed 
that the leadership convention did not ultimately constitute 
a selection mechanism allo^ying the control of elites by non­
elites or for the competition betvzeen elites for the support 
of non-elites. Moreover, the character of preselection and 
rules of the game tended to limit the appearance of strong 
competition between elites and to resolve existing conflict 
to the detriment of the most competitive candidates. As a 
rule then. Liberal leadership selection has not tended to 
conform to the democratic model, but resembled to a great 
degree a non-conflict or consensual process.
Influences cn the Nature of Leadership Selection
The analysis of leadership selection in the Liberal 
party has sustained two propositions concerning the nature of
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the selection process: (1) the lack of a rigorous competitive 
or democratic framework and (2) the predominance of con­
sensual variables as the operating criteria of selection. To 
account for the prevalence of these characteristics, three 
factors can be mentioned - Liberal party ideology, the 
structural characteristics of the party and the structure and 
function of the mechanism of selection itself.
The structural characteristics of a political party 
provide the most immediate influence on the nature of its 
internal processes. The most significant structural 
characteristics of the Liberal party of Canada over the
period 1919 to 1968 have been those deriving from its cadre
1 2 nature and its close relationship to governmental power.
In consequence of these characteristics of the party, the
probability, (and suitability), of a leadership selection
process which provided either for the control of elites by
T^lie structure of a cadre party resembles a "grouping 
of notabilities for the preparation of elections, conducting 
campaigns and maintaining contact td.th the candidates." See M. 
Duverger, Political Parties (London: Methuen, 1959), p. 64. 
For the Liberal party as a cadre party, see Engelmann, F. C. 
and Schïvartz, M., Political Parties and the Canadian Social 
Structure (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, lW7), p. '2'4'8'.
^According to the typology developed by Engelmann and 
Schimrtz the Liberal party is a broad-based, success-oriented, 
cadre party which has possessed governmental power, op. cit.. 
p. 248.
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ïicn-elites or for the extensive competition of elites for 
non-elite support was diminished.
The subservient role of non-elites in relation to the 
occupancy of the leadership position stems from the nature of 
party as an organized political group. According to the 
traditional theory of party oligarchy, as ezcpounded by 
Robert Michels and others, the masses or non-elites are in­
capable of self-government.^ Consequently,
Organization implies the tendency to oligarchy.
In every organization, whether it be a political 
party, a professional union, or any other 
association of the kind, the aristocratic 
tendency manifests itself very clearly.
The mechanism of the organization while con­
ferring a solidity of structure, induces serious 
changes in the organized mass, completely 
inverting the respective positions of leaders and 
led. As a result of organization every party or 
professional union becomes divided into a minority 
of directors and majority of directed. 4
In respect to the most pre-eminent party office - party
leaders, non-elites cannot practically control the position
through the direct assumption of its functions. Rather, the
prerogative of control was applicable only in the sense that
non-elites could threaten to replace existing leadership with
^See Michels Robert, Political Parties; A Sociological 
Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modem Democracy (IÏew 
York; Hearst* s,' l9l5)' p.'‘390 and also Duverger, on. cit.. p. 151.
^Ibid.. p. 38. .
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another elite or choose among elites competing for the 
position.
If elite competition is discouraged, non-elite 
influence is further reduced. According to his conception of 
party as oligarchy, Michels’ believed that the circulation of 
elites in positions of authority was more assimilative than 
competitive in character.^ A contrary formulation has 
maintained that the occupancy of elite position reflects 
a "stratarchic" rather than oligarchic party structure. Tlius, 
party possesses a more diverse elite group, which necessitates 
conflict and accommodation.^
The oligarchic rather than stratarchic model has been 
more appropriate to the conduct of leadership selection in 
the Liberal party of Canada. Thus, the low significance of 
democratic or conflict criteria in the selecting of Liberal 
leaders derives from a party structure discouraging the 
development of independent centres or foundations of 
political poxTer from which sets of counter-elites could be 
recruited. Of special significance xfas the lack of secondary 
associations reasonably detached from the control of the
%icbels, op. cit.. p. 378.
&See Eldersveld, S. J., Political Parties: A Behavioural 
Analysis. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), pp. 9-10.'"
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prevailing party elite. According to at least one study of 
the conditions of democratic systems, this constitutes a 
basic necessity for the institution of internal conflict.^
Thus, the lack of viable independent secondary organizations, 
represented by the inferior status and influence possessed by 
both the federal extra-Parliamentary party and the provincial 
Liberal parties encouraged, along xd.th the party discipline 
enforced by the Cabinet-Parliamentary system of government, 
the undemocratic nature of the party structure.
The development of the Liberal Party of Canada has 
featured the predominance of the Parliamentary party and 
leader at the expense of an independent extra-Parliamentary 
organization. In fact, the 1948 leadership convention xms 
the first held in which any official party organization out­
side of the legislative party existed. Its inability to 
influence the direction of party output as a counterbalance 
to the Cabinet and party leader was witnessed by the latter*s 
usually preeminent control over the nature of party policy.
As previously discussed, the resolutions of party conventions 
xmre not considered as binding directives of legislative
7See Lipset, S. M. et. Union Democracy: The Internal 
Politics’ of the International Typographical Union. (Nex7 York: 
Doubleday, Anchor, 1956), pp. 92-117. Also F. E. Jones, "Structural 
Determinants of Consensus and Cohesion in Complex Organizations". 
Canadian Reviexf of Sociology and Anthropology. V (November, 1968), 
227.
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leadership. The creation of electoral programs was usually 
the prerogative of Parliamentary elites in xdiich the inter­
vention of the party organisation xms rare.^
The ineffectiveness of extra-Parliamentary organisation 
xms evident in leadership selection as xzell as policy formation. 
Although the great majority of delegates to conventions xmre 
not holders or past holders of legislative office, the absence 
of a strong, centralized party organization made inevitable 
the identification of these delegates with elites in the 
legislative party and xd.th the goals^ articulated by this 
elite. There xms little opportunity therefore for an 
alternative group of elites or set of goals to conpete xfith 
those prevailing under the existing leadership. This dominance 
of the Liberal legislative party was moreover, manifested in 
the prerogative of the party leader for much of this period 
in respect to the initiation or call of a national leadership 
convention. In addition, the preeminent role of the 
legislative party was reflected in the significant degree of
^For one excellent example of this procedure, see John 
Meisel, The Canadian General Election of 1957. (Toronto* 
University of Toronto Press, 1962), p. 38.
^In practical terms, the predominance of external goals 
of electoral success as stipulated by the party ideology. The 
fusion of legislative and bureaucratic parties meant the goals 
and ideology of the former remained fundamentally unchallenged.
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delegate strength it maintained at each convention.
The lack of effective extra-Parliaraentary challenges 
to the leadership of the Liberal party was especially vital 
in view of the unity and discipline required of legislative 
elites under a Cabinet form of government. Esxept for 1919, 
all leadership conventions of the Liberal party have been 
held during periods of Liberal government (1948, 1968) or at 
a time xdien prospects of future electoral success were 
regarded as high. The demands, xdiich xjere often articulated 
by the party leader^ for solidarity and discipline among 
Cabinet elites restricted the amount of open policy debate 
x-Tith which the Parliamentary elites could talce issue. In 
1948 and 1968 particularly, prolonged engagement in policy 
debate xvas not appreciated by the party leader and Prime 
Minister. Moreover, advocacy of policies xdiich contradicted 
previous party, and therefore Cabinet, policy were somexdiat 
incongruous since the critic himself had participated in 
and was responsible for these decisions. It x^ as not incidental, 
therefore, that two of the three specific critics of past 
party policy and advocates of specific policy alternatives 
- C. G. Power and Eric Kierans - xfere outside the jurisdiction 
of Cabinet rules. Certainly, in the 1968 case, sanctions 
xvere threatened against those candidates xvho otherxvlse would
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have felt obliged to pursue a more programmatic leadership 
campaign.
The costs of incurring sanctions imposed by the 
present or future party leader xmre highest xvith respect 
to those candidates who, due to their political background, 
would be most likely to challenge the party leadership. The 
potential candidates x-jith the most political ambition, xfhose 
political career was extensive, x-;ould incur the heaviest 
penalties, in terms of status, by the loss of Cabinet 
position.10 The "political outsider", xdio had less attachment 
and need for the status incurring from political office, 
ironically did not possess the political ambition to conpete 
for the party leadership. The restrictions of Cabinet govern­
ment on competitiveness betxveen elites xms most effective, 
since it affected inordinately precisely those elites X'jho 
otherxd.se x»70uld be most likely to challenge existing leadership.
Prolonged tenure as the government party also 
encouraged the inability of provincial parties to act as 
foundations for the emergence of counter elites in opposition 
to the existing party leadership or in competition xdth federal
lOThe effects on the status of elites of internal conflict 
over the leadership roles has been suggested as a prime variable 
in the emergence of two-party, democratic systems xdthin organ­
izations.See Lipset, et. ai., o£. cit., pp. 239-247.
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party elites. Certainly a comparison of elites vying for the
leadership of the Canadian Liberal and Conservative parties
represents a correlation betx^een possession of federal
executive pox^ er and the significance of leaders of
11provincial parties.
There is reason to maintain tliat long tenure in 
federal government by the Liberal party has had the effect, 
through party structure,of denigrating the role of 
provincial parties as major influences on federal leadership 
selection. Under the structure of success-seeking parties, 
the nexus of party structure is provided by the material and 
psychological benefits deriving from the extent of the party*s 
capture of executive poiver. In e federal party system, the 
level of party most capable of providing these benefits xd.ll 
gamer the more thorough attachment of party adherents and 
therefore constitute a stronger foundation upon v/hich political
TlPor the lack of provincial party elites among
Liberal candidates in contrast to those of the Conservatives, 
see Chapter IV. Since 1919, the Liberal party has held federal 
office for all but 12 of 52 (to 1971) years.
12of course, ideology is a major variable here too.
/. "federal" party ideology has not been unremoved from this 
monopoly of government and its effect on party structure.
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elites and leaders can function. Tlie inordinate success 
of the federal Liberals has resulted in the ability to 
distribute a multitude of rex'jards to supporters and in the 
consequent preeminence of federal Parliamentary elites. In 
the actual selection of leaders, the relatively more 
favourable position of federal elites xvas reinforced by the 
election of delegates on the basis of federal constituency 
organizations. Since a great proportion of these delegates 
VTere actually holders of some form of constituency office 
and xfere elected by the local federal constituency party, 
it can be assumed that these delegates x\7ere those most likely 
to have received rewards from the federal party* s position in 
the past and therefore most favourable to the leadership and 
goals represented by the federal Parliamentary elite.
Given this centralized structure, xAich is maintained by 
continued electoral success, provincial parties have not
l^The argument has been advanced that Canadian oarties 
generally tend to be relatively more centralized than the
federal party system of the United States, for example. See 
Corry, J. A. and Hcdgetts, J. E., Democratic Government and 
Politics, 3rd edition (Toronto; University of Toronto Press, 
1959), p. 251. Comparisons of the txvo major Canadian parties 
have concluded the Liberals to be more centralized than the 
Conservatives. See Meisel, John, "Recent Changes in Canadian 
Parties", in Party Politics in Canada. 2nd edition, ed.
Thorbum, II. G., (Toronto; Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 45.
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provided foundations upon which Internal conflict over 
leadership selection could be based. The continuing tendency 
toward greater separation of federal and provincial parties, 
exemplified by the formation of a distinct, federal Quebec 
Liberal party in 1964, has no doubt, assuming continued 
electoral success, accelerated this tendency. In this respect, 
party structure provides not only a variable explaining the 
lack of conflict in the Liberal leadership selection process, 
but also can account for the great differences, especially in 
terms of the nature of candidates and leaders, betx^een the 
selection of Liberal leaders and that characteristic of the 
Canadian Conservative and United States’ parties.
The absence of secondary organisation, such as an 
independent extra Parliamentary organisation and provincial 
parties, relevant to federal leadership selection, and the 
character of Cabinet organisation militating against the 
emergence of conflict xyithin the Parliamentary elite resulted 
in a structural environment generally hostile to elite 
coapetition. The national party convention could not 
guarantee the viability of a competitive form of leadership 
selection, since the latter depended on the existence of 
competing sets of elites and of uncontrolled delegates 
desirous and capable of choosing betx/een them. In the final
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
166
analysis, a merely formal competitive structure, such as the 
leadership convention, could not operate effectively in the 
absence of environmental conditions conducive to the necessary 
degree of internal party conflict.
The leadership convention’s contribution to intra­
party democracy xvas also limited of course by its oxvn 
characteristics. Throughout most of its history representation 
of Parliamentary elites remained substantial. Furthermore,
although the convention was established as the sole means of
«
leadership selection, accountability, prior to 1966, was not 
either a constitutional or practical requirement of party 
leadership. The lack of accountability and the inapplicability 
of the party convention as a basis for internal party conflict 
was manifested in the power possessed by the party leader. 
First, it V7BS the leader himself, xdio was alx^ays responsible 
for the call of a convention to choose a successor.
Secondly, his pre-eminence as past leader and, in txm of three 
cases, as Prime Minister offered him substantial political 
resources to intervene in and to influence the process of 
leadership selection.
Although the national convention did not function 
entirely effectively to promote competition for the party 
leadership, a second, latent function was performed by the
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institution, Tlie leadership convention ser^ /ed to provide en 
established method of arriving at a collective decision end 
thereby to legitimate the character of this decision. In 
this sense, consensus rather than conflict constituted the 
primary objective of the mechanism of selection. The widening 
of the selection mechanism, in terms of participation, from 
the legislative caucus to representative convention broadened 
party involvement in the selection of leaders; hovTever, 
rather than encouraging conflict, this extension allowed the 
socialisation of important party members \vdth respect to the 
choice of party leader and thereby party activity as a whole. 
In the Liberal party of Canada, this latent function of the 
national party convention has apparently prevailed over the 
manifest function of providing for conflict in leadership 
selection and has represented a major variable accounting 
for the consensual nature of the party's selection process.
For at least two reasons, the latent function of 
the party convention cannot be considered a sufficient reason 
for the prevalence of consensus in the selection of leaders 
in the Liberal party. First, the extent of members' 
concurrence in the outcome of the functional mechanism depends 
to a substantial degree on some form of prior commitment to a 
more inclusive purpose. Thus, participants in leadership
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selection were committed to the concerns and purposes of the 
party itself rather than merely to a particular result of the 
selection process. Secondly, only in terms of a pre-existing 
consensual variable can differences in leadership selection 
of parties, such as the Canadian Liberals and Conservatives, 
using similar mechanisms of selection, be explained.
The quality of the party ideology, containing not 
only a certain political philosophy but also expressing the 
party's position and direction in relation to reality, has 
constituted the prior variable determining the consensual 
character of leadership selection in the Liberal party. The 
non-class economic ideology as well as the adherence to the 
ideas of French-English partnership and of the federal formula 
gave the Liberal party an ideological outlook deprecating , 
the utility of conflict and asserting the value of political 
cooperation and consensus. The priority of consensus witnessed 
in the selection of Liberal leaders was influenced by the extent 
to which these attributes were accepted by participants as 
practical, as well as philosophical, guides to action.
The force, which allowed for the influence of these 
traits on the determination of leadership was the primacy 
accorded to the external goals of the party. The predominance 
of external rather than internal goals derives to some ezctent
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from the very nature of a political party. As S. J,
Eldersveld describes them, "parties are unique structurally 
because they are groups oriented to the achievement of special 
goals and functions under unique environmental conditions in 
the society.Moreover, the Canadian Liberal party has 
developed in the context of a cadre party* s emphasis on the 
esctemal goals of electoral success and occupation of 
governmental office. This development has tended to maintain 
a high emphasis on the operation of the party in the environ­
ment and to resist the entrance of concerns or goals based on 
the internal activity of p a r t y , T h e  predominance of 
external goals expressed in the party ideology, constituted 
the linlcage between a party ideology deprecating conflict 
and the consensual form of leadership selection characteristic 
of the party,
^^Eldersveld, op, cit,. p. 2,
l^In essence this difference reduces to a situation 
where the internal dynamics of a party are regarded as either 
a means to a given end (electoral success in the Liberal party) 
or as to a great degree an end in itself. The desire to build 
a social movement at the eiroense of immediate electoral success 
characteristic of elements in the Co-operative Commonwealth 
Federation is a fine example of the latter. See Young, W, D,, 
"pie Anatomy of a Party; The national C.C.F, 1932-1961, 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969;, pp. 177-216.
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The denmnds made by the political and social 
environment vnthin which the party operated were such that 
an ideology predicated on consensus was most functional in 
terms of the accomplishment of the party goals. The form of 
Parliamentary government, in which the capture of executive 
power required a stable legislative majority, meant that 
unity was a much more immediate requirement of the Liberals, 
than of United States* or even of Canadian opposition parties. 
Moreover, unity and a consensual party ideology were conducive 
to electoral success, given the diverse nature of the 
Canadian electorate and society. Finally, the maintenance 
of the political system necessitated adherence to the 
federal formula at the expense of revisionist philosophies, 
and the integration of French-Canadian political elites.
The nature end pre-eminence of the external goals of 
the Liberal party were therefore the foundation for the 
consensual nature of leadership selection. As an internal 
and therefore secondary activity of the party, leadership 
selection reflected the predominant external goals of the 
party. In effect, the selection of a party leader was 
generally regarded as a means, although an essential one, 
to accomplish the wider goals of the party in the environ­
ment rather than an end in itself.
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The primacy of external goals and the nature of the 
party ideology promoted consensual rather than competitive 
values in party activity as a tdiole. Internal processes of 
the party were thus conducted ivith the same eschewal of 
conflict and preservation of consensus as external activity. 
In the final analysis, the high emphasis on consensual 
variables in the selection of Liberal leaders derived 
substantially from the party*s relation and response to its 
environment, as perceived by its members,
Leadership, Leadership Selection And Political Party
In general, leadership selection in the Liberal party 
has reflected the basic structure and the ideological 
foundation with which the external activity of the Liberal 
party was conducted. The process by which leadership 
emerged was therefore determined in the context of the party 
as a whole. In the Liberal party the environment was most 
favourable to a consensual, rather than a conflict, model of 
leadership selection,
A consensual form of leadership selection allowed
1 Lipset*s study of trade-union democracy refers to 
the "cult unity" enforced on many unions by the necessity of 
membership unity in the conduct of bargaining with industry. 
Similar to Liberal party ideology, this "cult" hinders the 
development of internal pluralism and conflict. See Lipset, 
et I C.1,. pp. 270-273,
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that type of compromise, consensual leadership, which has 
prevailed in the Liberal party, to emerge. Both the long 
unchallenged tenure, as well as the selection, of Liberal 
leaders can be attributed to their performance or potential 
performance, as conceived by the party membership, of the 
goals and purposes of the Liberal party. Of course, the 
actual practice of party leadership was not unrelated to the 
maintenance of these goals. In fact, the adherence of Liberal 
leaders to the goals of electoral success and of the integration 
(recruitment) of French-Canadian political elites, after the 
necessity of conformity to party goals had declined, testifies 
to the reciprocal relationship, in secular terms, of leader­
ship and party.
In the final analysis, the nature of party emerges as 
a prime determinant of leadership in the Canadian Liberal party. 
In this light the performance of political leadership in 
Canada must be seen as a partial consequence of the 
applicability of party activity end goals to the requirements 
of the political system as a whole. As a corollary, political 
party should be considered a significant determining variable 
in any complete explication of the meaning of political 
leadership,
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